

# JOINT PUB 3-05

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
## DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS




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Joint Pub 3-05  
28 October 1992

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1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth principles and military guidance to govern the joint activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.
2. Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.
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## LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

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PAGE	CHANGE
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II-1 thru II-16	0
III-1 thru III-14	0
IV-1 thru IV-10	0
V-1 thru V-14	0
A-1 thru A-8	0
B-1 thru B-6	0
C-1 thru C-8	0
D-1 thru D-4	0
E-1 thru E-2	0
F-1 thru F-10	0
GL-1 thru GL-22	0

Deleted Pages: None.



## DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

### PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication establishes the basic doctrine for the joint employment of SOF. The principles, fundamentals, guidelines, and conceptual framework described herein are provided to facilitate interoperability with conventional military forces and between Service SOF and to establish a baseline for the development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. All aspects of this publication are consistent with and complementary to the basic doctrine established in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations."

2. Scope and Application. This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint SO in peacetime military operations, military hostilities short of war, and war. It also provides guidance for commanders to determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare SOF to conduct the missions and collateral activities herein described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions appropriate for SOF. This doctrine applies to those who:

- a. Establish national SO policy.
- b. Provide strategic direction to SOF (Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders).
- c. Employ joint SOF (commanders of unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs).
- d. Support, or are supported by, joint SOF (specified commands, component commands, JTF, and Services).
- e. Train, educate, or otherwise prepare personnel to perform SO.
- f. Provide conventional forces to augment designated SOF when circumstances dictate.

3. Basis. The development of Joint Pub 3-05 is based on the following primary sources:

- a. Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by:

(1) Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

(2) Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.

b. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

c. JCSM-712-89, 1 August 1989 "Unified Command Plan (UCP)."

d. JCSM-71-87, 29 May 1987 "Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command."

e. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986 "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

f. Joint Pub 1-01, 15 April 1988 "Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program)."

g. Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989 "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

h. Joint Test Pub 3-0, 10 January 1990 "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations."

i. Joint Test Pub 2-0, 30 June 1991, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

j. Joint Test Pub 3-07, October 1990 "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict."

k. Joint Test Pub 5-0, 26 July 1991 "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."

l. Joint Test Pub 6-0, 12 June 1990 "Doctrine for C3 Systems Support to Joint Operations."

4. Supersession. This publication supersedes JCS Pub 20, Volume I, 1 January 1986, "Joint Special Operations Policy, Concepts, and Procedures."

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This publication describes SO missions and forces, characteristics, and capabilities across the operational continuum. It outlines the organization and C2 of SOF when assigned to a JFC. Further, it provides guidance for appropriate SOF mission selection and subsequent planning, preparation, and support to ensure full, effective employment of SOF in pursuit of national security policy.

#### 2. General

##### a. Joint Doctrine

(1) Doctrine is a statement of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces or elements thereof in support of national objectives. It is authoritative (vice directive) in nature and requires judgment in its application. Joint doctrine guides the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine is promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) The doctrine herein is authoritative guidance for the Services and combatant commands when active, reserve, or National Guard forces are employed in coordinated SO. Service doctrine will be consistent with joint doctrine.

(3) The doctrinal precepts of this manual are unclassified. They are intended for wide readership, thereby creating a common understanding within the armed forces of the essential principles of SO. However, most information related to specific SO plans and operations is classified and some is further caveated as requiring special access.

b. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. JTTP are the actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. This document provides broad doctrinal guidance for strategic and operational joint employment of SOF. Supporting JTTP publications (Joint Pubs 3-05.3 & 3-05.5) have been developed to amplify this joint SO doctrine.

(1) Tactics. The term tactics refers to the employment of units in combat or to the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units or their elements in relation to each other or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. With respect to doctrine, tactics are the theoretical methods by which doctrinal principles are achieved. For example, to achieve the principle of surprise, SOF may employ various deception, EW, and infiltration tactics.

(2) Techniques. Techniques provide the detail of tactics and refer to the basic methods of using people and equipment to carry out a tactical task. For example, to exercise the principle of maneuver, SOF may employ the tactic of infiltrating by night, using HALO parachuting, combat swimming, or other such specialized techniques.

(3) Procedures. Procedures are the lowest level of detail and are used to standardize or make routine the performance of critical or recurring activities. They are often promulgated in the interest of interoperability or safety. For example, there are specific procedures for the conduct of HALO parachuting.

(4) Service and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Joint doctrine guides and sustains both Service procedures and JTTP. SOF use a combination of their own Service-unique, joint, and other Services' TTP to carry out assigned tasks. For example, an Army or Navy SO combat swimmer element would use Navy procedures for "locking out" of a submerged submarine. It may then employ its own Service TTP once ashore to carry out its mission. Finally, the team might report its activities using joint C4 procedures.

3. Special Operations. SO are a form of warfare characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons, and forces. A mission, under a certain set of environmental constraints, may require the application of SO skills and techniques. Change one or more of those characteristics, and the mission may no longer fit the category of SO. For example, the Grenada operation was designed to rescue a large number of American citizens and publicly demonstrate US resolve. As such, it required a visible, conventional operation on a relatively large scale, with SO in support and targeted at specific objectives. Conversely, had the goals been to recover a small number of detained personnel and to limit US presence, SO might have been selected as the preferred option. SO are not bound by any specific environment. They are described by the transitory characteristics and the constraints placed upon a given mission.

a. Employment of conventional forces usually involves movement of large operational units and requires extensive support structures. Such force movement and employment generally are observable and traceable to the United States. However, the capabilities of SOF primarily are a function of individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional, combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and often self-sufficient (for short periods) nature of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military responses that do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of necessarily larger, or more visible, conventional forces.

b. SOF are not a substitute for strong conventional forces but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces so that they can achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precisely focused use of force.

c. SOF can be quickly task-organized and rapidly deployed to provide the NCA a selective, flexible crisis response capability. Often, SOF may be the force of choice for the NCA to provide a capability that falls between diplomatic initiatives and the overt commitment of conventional force. SOF are designed for specific principal missions. Properly employed, they provide an added dimension for the combatant commander. An imprecise understanding of SOF capabilities or the improper employment or support of SOF at any level of command can result in mission failure, attendant political costs, and possible loss of the entire force.

d. SO are usually joint, but they may be conducted as single-Service operations. Even single-Service conduct of SO requires joint support and coordination. The planning process may be staffed jointly, while the execution and C2 structure may be either joint or single Service. This publication describes SOF interoperability requirements and provides for employment of SOF in coordination with conventional forces.

4. Characteristics of Special Operations. SO are marked by certain characteristics that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. They:

a. Are principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical, and often perishable targets. They offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first mission fail.

b. Are often principally politico-military in nature and subject to oversight at the national level. Frequently demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid coordination with other commands, Services, and Government agencies.

c. Often require responsive joint ground, air, and maritime operations and the C2 architecture permanently resident in the existing SOF structure.

d. May frequently be covert or clandestine.

e. Are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible for either military or political reasons.



f. Rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently employ deception to achieve success.

g. Are often conducted at great distances from established support bases, requiring sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to penetrate and recover from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

h. May require patient, long-term commitment in a given operational area to achieve national goals through security assistance and/or nation assistance activities or extended UW operations. Often, the training and organization of indigenous forces are required to attain these objectives.

i. Frequently require discriminate and precise use of force; a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment; and often rapid development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other DOD forces.

j. Are primarily conducted by specially recruited, selected, and trained personnel, organized into small units tailored for specific missions or environments. Missions often require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the country where employed.

k. Require detailed intelligence, thorough planning, decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed rehearsal.

5. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces. The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities.

a. Personnel may undergo lengthy selection processes or extensive mission-specific training programs above basic military skill training to achieve entry-level SO skills.

b. Units are small and necessarily maintain high personal and professional levels of maturity and experience, usually in more than one principal field. The complex SO selection and long leadtime objective and subjective maturation process make any rapid replacement of personnel or capabilities very difficult.

c. SOF are often organized jointly and routinely plan, execute, command, and control operations from a joint perspective.

d. Area orientation is often required and includes the capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the area's environmental conditions. Detailed area orientation, including mastery of language and culture, requires long-term, dedicated training and may be applicable to air, ground, and maritime SOF units, depending upon mission assignment.

e. To develop and maintain skills, SOF should train and exercise under conditions resembling the operational environment in which they intend to operate.

6. Principles of War. In general, the principles of war, as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0, are as applicable to the conduct of SO as to conventional military operations. However, the specific characteristics of SO and the utility of SOF in situations short of war may require commanders to exploit the specific attributes of SOF. For example, the principles of maneuver and security are critical to SO, while the small size of SOF does not lend itself to employing the principle of mass in force-on-force engagements. Such considerations and planning guidance are discussed in Chapter IV and Appendixes D and E.

7. Special Operations Objectives. SO missions may be conducted across the entire operational continuum and may be focused on strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.

a. Strategic objectives are directed toward the attainment of national goals. The NCA designates these objectives and sanctions the military means to

achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SOF may be employed directly by the NCA or combatant commanders. The British Special Operations Executive operation to destroy the German heavy water production at Vemork, Norway, in 1943 (and hence nullify the German capability to manufacture atomic weapons) and the US raid to rescue the prisoners of war at Son Tay, North Vietnam, in 1970, are examples of SO with strategic implications.

b. Operational objectives are established by theater commanders or their component commanders based on the theater campaign plan. Achieving operational objectives leads directly to military success within a theater of war or to the success of a major operation. SOF are normally employed in pursuit of operational objectives by a theater commander, the commander of a subordinate unified command, the commanders of JTF, or by the commander of a Service or functional component command. The employment of OSS operational detachments to organize behind-the-lines resistance in France and Burma in World War II, as well as the German neutralization of the Belgian fortress of Eben Emael by a surprise attack in force in 1940, are examples of SO with operational implications.

c. Tactical objectives drive the employment of forces in individual battles and engagements. The appropriate commander will assign SOF tactical objectives and operating areas within the context of a larger operation or campaign. They may also be assigned tactical objectives in support of conventional force operations. However, conventional force commanders should recognize that SOF are of finite size and should not be used simply as a substitute for inadequate conventional force availability. Assignment of SOF is normally for a specified period of time or for a specific task or tasks. Ranger operations to seize the airfield at Point Salines, Grenada, in 1983, as well as the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams' efforts in clearing boat lanes for amphibious assaults in all theaters in World War II, are examples of such tactical support to conventional operations.

8. The Operational Continuum. Military operations are conducted within a continuum consisting of three general states: peacetime military operations, hostilities short

of war, and war. This model of a continuum assists the combatant commander to articulate strategic situations within a theater that are described by a variety of political, economic, and military conditions. Although the following discussion of SO applicability to the states within the continuum describes each in discrete terms, in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins. The continuum model gives the NCA and JFC the ability to describe any strategic situation in clear terms and define needs, devise strategies, and project resources to meet the threat.

a. In many situations, the role of SOF is to support conventional operations. In others, when the application of conventional military force is not feasible or appropriate, and particularly when the situation calls for a subtle, indirect, or low visibility approach, SO may offer the most viable military option. In any situation, the conduct of SO must be consistent with national and regional strategies. SO should be addressed in campaign and contingency plans and integrated with other military efforts and, when appropriate, with political, economic, and informational activities.

b. Peacetime military operations are a nonhostile state wherein political, economic, psychological, and military measures, short of US combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives (Joint Pub 3-0).

(1) Peacetime military operations routinely take place in a permissive environment where HN military and law enforcement agencies have the control, intent, and capability to assist friendly operations. US military forces may provide HA or train indigenous personnel to assist host-nation development of military/paramilitary infrastructure and capability. Here, the military instrument is applied for its preventive or deterrent effect to remove the underlying causes of armed conflict or war.

(2) Like all military forces, SOF are a deterrent. Regular demonstrations of their readiness and capabilities in combined exercises with friends and allies worldwide contribute to

deterrence and provide a subtle, low-visibility means of extending US influence. Likewise, SOF also contribute to the attainment of peacetime military objectives and may promote regional stability by advising, training, and assisting friends and allies. Such peacetime activities could be characterized by SOF participation in US humanitarian and security assistance programs. When confrontation and tension occur involving the clear threat or use of armed force, a situation exists that is a potential point of transition to a state of conflict.

c. Hostilities short of war are armed struggles or clashes between organized parties within a nation or between nations to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. These operations are often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. Depending upon environment, the full range of SOF capabilities may be applicable.

d. War is sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited, with some self-imposed restraints on resources or objectives. Or, it may be general, with the total resources of a nation or nations employed and the national survival of the belligerents at stake (Joint Pub 3-0).

(1) Regardless of the level of violence or scope of military involvement in peacetime military operations, hostilities short of war, or war, principal strategic objectives always remain political. In war, nonmilitary instruments of power frequently support the military in its goal of defeating the enemy. Such defeat need not necessarily come from the annihilation of the enemy's military force, but may come from the destruction of the enemy's ability or will to

continue. This destruction may be achieved by selectively attacking a limited set of critical military, political, economic, and/or social targets, forcing a cessation of hostilities and, thereby, avoiding total or protracted war.

(2) In war, SO are normally conducted in support of conventional warfighting within the framework of the theater campaign. Autonomous SO directed toward strategic objectives may also be conducted, under the direct control of either the NCA or combatant commanders. The predominant SOF tasks in general war are the conduct of DA and SR operations and UW. These missions are normally aimed at conventional military centers of gravity and focus on enemy vulnerabilities such as C4 systems, logistics infrastructure, or LOC. Such operations affect both the enemy's military capacity and his will to fight. Likewise, other UW and DA missions aimed at recovering personnel from hostile territories may be conducted. FID and SA activities, as economy of force measures, may also be conducted in support of friendly, allied, or coalition governments on the periphery of the main battle area.

## 9. Low Intensity Conflict

a. LIC is an environment in which political rather than military considerations predominate. A major task for SOF in LIC is participation in US government FID programs with the principal role of advising, training, and otherwise assisting HN forces. Such activities are normally focused on counterinsurgency and include nation building tasks. Advice, training, and assistance also may be focused on combatting terrorism and countering drug trafficking. Similar activities to facilitate national and regional security may also be conducted. These activities frequently require SOF to be sufficiently flexible and politically adroit to meet the nonmilitary objectives of many of these programs.

b. Certain SOF are well suited to participate in military advisory and assistance activities by virtue of their military skills, area orientation, cultural awareness, and mastery of languages. SOF are particularly capable and experienced in training

indigenous forces in many of the small unit tactical skills applicable to insurgency and counterinsurgency. Training of indigenous forces is especially applicable in a coalition warfare environment, as in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

c. On occasion, LIC also may require the direct employment of US military forces, including SOF. The operations may include presence, shows of force, demonstrations, evacuation of noncombatants, CT, CD, missions, other tasks broadly termed contingency operations, and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations by US combat forces. All may require, singly, or in some combination, the conduct of UW, DA, or SR (See Chapter II), either independently or in conjunction with conventional forces.

d. In addition to supporting friendly and allied or coalition governments, the United States may also choose to support insurgencies or armed resistance movements against either hostile regimes or occupying powers. The military aspect of such missions is classic UW for which certain SOF are specifically trained, organized, and equipped. When directed by appropriate authority, SOF may support these activities either directly or indirectly through other, nonmilitary, government agencies.

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## CHAPTER II

### FORCES AND MISSIONS

#### 1. Special Operations Forces

a. As specified by law in title 10, US Section 167, SOF are units of the Armed Forces that meet one of the following criteria:

(1) Identified as core forces or as augmenting forces in the JSCP, Annex E

(2) Described in the Terms of Reference and Conceptual Operations Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in effect on April 1, 1986

(3) Designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

b. Under certain circumstances, conventional forces may provide the capabilities required to conduct a specific special operation. However, designated SOF are principally structured to be the force of choice under most circumstances. They possess unique capabilities designed to address those missions, regardless of where they are conducted in the operational continuum.

(1) US Army. Active and Reserve component forces include Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, PSYOP and CA units (see Appendix A).

(2) US Navy. Active and Reserve component forces include SEAL and SDV teams and SBUs. (see Appendix B).

(3) US Air Force. Active and Reserve component forces include:

(a) Fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft and aircrews to conduct infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply; aerial fire support; and aerial refueling

(b) Composite special tactics teams composed of combat control and pararescue forces, weather, communications, and other combat support units (see Appendix C).

(4) Other Forces. Although not designated as core SOF, certain general purpose forces may receive enhanced training and be specially equipped and organized to conduct missions related to SO. These training enhancements are principally designed to improve the primary combat capabilities of the conventional force and, thereby, to SUPPORT SO on a nondedicated, mission-specific basis. These forces include:

(a) Designated Navy surface, subsurface, and aviation elements.

(b) Designated Air Force airlift, strike, and tanker elements.

(c) Designated Fleet Marine Forces assigned as elements of embarked, forward-deployed MAGTFs. See Joint Pub 3-05.3, "Joint SO Operational Procedures" for a detailed discussion of these elements.

2. Missions. The five principal missions of SO are UW, DA, SR, FID, and CT. While SOF provide unique, versatile, and flexible forces designed primarily to meet these missions, conventional forces may be required for support, depending upon mission circumstances. However, the inherent capabilities of SOF also make them suitable for employment in a range of collateral SO mission activities, such as HA, counterdrug, and personnel recovery operations, among others. All of these missions can be conducted and are especially applicable in a coalition warfare environment, where SOF capabilities make them especially useful in this type of short term and/or limited scope operational arrangement of forces.

### 3. Unconventional Warfare

a. UW includes guerrilla warfare and other low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and E&E.

(1) GW consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush

tactics against enemy vulnerabilities. In the latter stages of a successful insurgency, guerrilla forces may directly oppose selected, vulnerable enemy forces while avoiding enemy concentrations of strength.

(2) Subversion is an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. All elements of the resistance organization contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

(3) Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy's infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the war-making capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.

(4) In UW, the intelligence function must collect, develop, and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the established government or occupying power and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence activities have both offensive and defensive purposes and range well beyond military issues, including social, economic, and political information that may be used to identify threats, operational objectives, and necessary supporting operations.

(5) E&E is an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to:

(a) Move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control,

(b) Avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control,

(c) Once captured, escape. SO personnel often will work in concert with the JRCC of the JFC while operating in an E&E network (See evasion and escape net in glossary).

b. UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the US perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving US national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. SOF provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic or operational objectives.

c. When UW is conducted independently during military operations short of war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include:

- (1) Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
- (2) Neutralizing the target authority's power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
- (3) Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority's leadership.
- (4) Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
- (5) Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.

d. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. However, the political and psychological implications remain. UW operations delay and disrupt hostile military activities, interdict LOC, deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas, divert the hostile power's attention and resources from the main battle area, and interdict hostile warfighting capabilities. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of air, sea, or ground battles, complement conventional military operations, and provide the JFC with the windows of opportunity needed to seize the initiative through offensive action.

e. During war, SOF may directly support the resistance movement by infiltrating operational elements into denied or politically sensitive areas. They organize, train, equip, and advise or direct the indigenous resistance organization. In situations short of war, when direct US military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, SOF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.

f. UW may be conducted by all designated SOF, but it is principally the responsibility of Army SF. Augmentation other than SOF, will usually be provided as the situation dictates by PSYOP and CA units, as well as other selected conventional combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.

#### 4. Direct Action

a. In the conduct of DA operations, units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage.

b. DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. SOF may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. DA operations are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results of strategic, operational, or critical tactical significance. They frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and selective strike capabilities of conventional forces. Operations typically involve:

- (1) Attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel).
- (2) Interdiction of critical LOC or other target systems.
- (3) Location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or materiel.
- (4) Seizure, destruction, or neutralization of critical facilities in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival.

c. DA is conducted by individuals and small units from team to multibattalion size. Although normally thought of in terms of ground or maritime close-combat type operations, they also include standoff attacks by weapon systems either delivered or directed by SOF.

- (1) Close combat tactics and techniques are employed when the target and mission require precise or discriminate application of force beyond the capability of other forces and weapon systems or when the mission requires recovery or capture of personnel or equipment.

- (2) Standoff attacks are conducted in support of close combat actions or independently when the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat type forces.

d. The methods for planning and conducting DA may be either deliberate or quick response.

- (1) Deliberately planned missions are preferred. They capitalize on detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and meticulous rehearsal to enhance the probability of mission accomplishment. A combination of time available, nature of the target, and the operational environment are keys to determining if a mission can be prosecuted effectively.

- (2) In response to crises, time-sensitive missions are conducted against perishable or fleeting target or to capitalize on narrow windows of enemy vulnerability. Because of limited planning and rehearsal time and usually incomplete intelligence

due to significant time constraints, the probability of mission success is generally less than that for deliberate operations.

e. DA missions to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control persons held captive, isolated, or threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas may be conducted when the priority of the operation is sufficiently high to warrant planning and conducting a special operation. SO recovery missions differ from Service CSAR operations. To respond in minimum time, Service CSAR forces usually rely on dedicated assets and established C2 nets that are often on alert. However, SOF recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. They routinely employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

f. DA missions may be conducted independently or within the context of larger conventional or unconventional operations or campaigns. They are conducted by Army SF, Ranger, and Special Operations Aviation units; by Navy SEAL teams, SBU, and SDV teams; and by Air Force SO gunships, vertical lift and fixed-wing insertion and/or extraction aircraft, and special tactics units.

## 5. Special Reconnaissance

a. SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods where there are constraints of weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures and/or other systems availability. SR is a human intelligence function that places US or US-controlled "eyes on target" in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory when authorized. SOF may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. SOF may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques and equipment and/or sophisticated clandestine collection methods and may employ indigenous assets. Typical SR missions may include:

(1) Contact with a resistance movement to assess resistance potential.

(2) Reconnaissance operations in advance of operations by conventional forces.

(3) Target acquisition of enemy C3 systems, troop concentrations, special weapons, LOC, and other military targets of significance to theater combatant commanders and their operational force commanders.

(4) Collection and reporting of critical information about the movement of enemy forces in or adjacent to the main battle area.

(5) Location and surveillance of critical or sensitive facilities in hostile or denied territory.

(6) Meteorological, geographic, demographic, and hydrographic reconnaissance to support specific aerospace, land, or maritime operations.

(7) Post-strike reconnaissance.

b. In addition to SR, SOF conduct reconnaissance to support their own operations. These tactical reconnaissance activities focus on the objectives assigned to SOF and are conducted before, during, and after the execution of specific UW, DA, FID, and CT operations.

## 6. Foreign Internal Defense

a. The primary role of SOF in this US Government interagency activity is to train, advise, and otherwise assist host nation military and paramilitary forces with the goal of the host nation being able, unilaterally, to assume responsibility to eliminate internal instability.

b. FID operations support a friendly government facing a threat to its internal stability and security. FID fosters internal development of the economic, social, political, and military segments of the nation's structure. These activities normally are of long duration and require patient adherence to and support of national policy. SOF will most probably live directly among the people they are supporting. This relationship mandates SOF display the highest respect and affinity for that population and take no action to further jeopardize noncombatants. FID operations that assist allied and friendly governments contribute to US interests and objectives by:



- (1) Enhancing US influence in the host nation and region.
- (2) Stabilizing the region.
- (3) Maintaining or improving US access.
- (4) Improving overall international cooperation.
- (5) Reducing the need for increased US assistance to the host nation and region.
- (6) Improving military-to-military relationships and interoperability of forces and enhancing the host nation's warfighting capabilities.

c. FID is not exclusively a SO mission. Rather, it is a joint and interagency activity in which SOF participate. SO FID requirements may be unilateral in the absence of any other US military effort, may support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or may support the employment of conventional military forces. FID may require that SOF participate in the following types of activities:

- (1) Advisory and assistance activities that develop and support the host nation military, paramilitary, and internal security organizations.
- (2) Intelligence activities that support other FID programs.
- (3) Civil-military operations that isolate the insurgent and exploit its vulnerabilities, including the inability to satisfy essential needs of the indigenous population. These operations deal with the relationships between:
  - (a) The host nation government and its population.
  - (b) Armed Forces of the United States and their host nation counterparts.
  - (c) Armed Forces of the United States and the indigenous population.

(d) Other US agencies and the host nation military.

(4) Tactical operations that focus on neutralizing and destroying the insurgent threat.

d. The objective of tactical operations in FID is to provide a secure environment in which balanced development can occur. Tactical operations should not be independent military actions aimed solely at destroying insurgent combat forces and their base areas. Tactical operations should be a part of a synchronized effort to gain broader objectives. Military operations conducted in FID may take several forms:

(1) Long-term population security operations conducted in territory that is generally under host nation government control. Their purpose is to consolidate the host nation's position and gain popular support by:

(a) Identifying and removing the social, economic, and political causes and basis for the insurgency.

(b) Isolating the insurgents from the civil population.

(c) Protecting the civil population from insurgent influence.

(d) Dealing, as required, with the insurgent infrastructure.

(2) Short-duration tactical operations conducted in contested or insurgent-controlled areas. Tactical operations are not usually decisive by themselves. They support consolidation operations by preventing insurgent forces from contesting host nation internal defense and development efforts. They aim to achieve this by:

(a) Isolating insurgent forces from their support.

(b) Interdicting insurgent infiltration routes and LOC.

(c) Destroying insurgent forces and base areas.

(3) Extended operations in remote areas that are insurgent-controlled or contested. Such operations are intended to deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent host nation government control over the area; rather, they are designed to undermine the insurgents' influence in the region. Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the host nation or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces to:

(a) Interdict insurgent activity.

(b) Destroy insurgent bases in the remote area.

(c) Demonstrate that the host nation government has not ceded control to the insurgents.

(d) Collect and report intelligence information concerning insurgent infrastructure, activities, and intentions in more populated areas.

(4) Border security is the responsibility of host nation police, customs, or paramilitary border forces. However, the threat may require combat-type border operations, particularly in remote areas. SOF advise and assist host nation forces assigned to prevent or interdict the infiltration of insurgent

personnel and materiel across international boundaries. The intent is to isolate insurgent forces from their external support, including external sanctuaries. Secondary purposes are to:

(a) Locate and interdict insurgent land, air, and water infiltration routes.

(b) Destroy insurgent forces and base areas adjacent to the border.

(c) Collect and report intelligence information concerning external support and insurgent infrastructure, activities, and intentions.

7. Counterterrorism. The primary mission of SOF in CT is to apply highly specialized capabilities to preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad.

a. Certain SOF are specifically organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform CT as a primary mission. CT missions may also be performed by other SOF or selected conventional US Armed Forces under extremely urgent and in extremis circumstances when principal NCA-designated SOF are not readily available. If the mission has not been executed by the in extremis force once the designated force arrives on scene, passing mission responsibility must be exercised with care. The in extremis force will have acquired critical and perishable information and will have developed an experience base of great value to the relieving force.

b. SOF conduct CT operations that include aspects of UW, DA, and SR missions to effect:

(1) Hostage rescue.

(2) Recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organizations.

(3) Attack on the terrorist infrastructure.

c. Because of the very low profile of most terrorist organizations, identifying targets for CT missions can be extremely difficult. Although a preemptive strike against terrorists may be preferred, CT missions must often be conducted after the terrorists have initiated a terrorist act.

d. Additionally, as a subset of FID, designated SOF units may also train selected host nation forces to perform CT missions. The level of SO force participation in this program is determined by US and host nation policy and legal considerations.

8. Collateral Special Operations Activities. The inherent capabilities of all military forces may periodically be applied to accomplish missions other than those for which the forces are principally organized, trained, and equipped. However, commanders should exercise care in allocating forces against nonprimary missions to preclude over commitment of those forces and the attendant reduction in their ability to meet principal tasks. Collateral activities in which SOF, by virtue of their inherent capabilities, may selectively be tasked to participate include: SA, HA, antiterrorism and other security activities, counterdrug operations, personnel recovery, and special activities.

a. Security Assistance. SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, or other related US statutes. The US Government sells defense articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries and international organizations that further US national security objectives. The primary SOF role in SA is to provide MTT and other forms of training assistance. Personnel providing SA services (including mobile training assistance) are prohibited by law from performing combatant duties.

b. Humanitarian Assistance. HA programs employ military personnel but are principally designed to promote nonmilitary objectives within a foreign civilian community. These objectives may include disaster relief; medical, veterinary, and dental aid; rudimentary construction; water and sanitation assistance; expedient communications; and support to and/or resettlement of displaced civilians (refugees or evacuees). Although HA does not fall solely under the purview of SO, certain SOF are well-suited to assist US Government-sponsored HA activities in remote areas, especially in a conflict environment. DOD resources may provide humanitarian and civil assistance and foreign disaster relief. Participation in HA requires significant interagency coordination, and PSYOP should be employed to enhance the positive effects of the program.

c. Antiterrorism and Other Security Activities. These activities ensure that the physical security of important persons, facilities, and events meets acceptable standards. Responding to requests from the Services and other government agencies, SOF can provide training and advice on how to reduce vulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats. SOF anticipate hostile activity and evaluate the adequacy of existing physical security systems, using their expertise in conducting operations similar to those that potentially threaten the persons and activities requesting their assistance. When directed, SOF can augment existing security forces to protect important persons and events, normally using SMU personnel.

d. Counterdrug. CD measures are interagency activities taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. As a general rule under the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385), DOD personnel and equipment may not be used in a domestic law enforcement capacity. In 1981, Congress enacted an exception that authorized specific DOD assistance in drug interdiction and drug eradication operations (10 USC 371-380). Designated civilian agencies of the US Government normally lead US CD activities within a host nation. The primary SOF role is to support US and host nation CD efforts abroad by advising, training, and assisting host nation military, paramilitary and, when specifically authorized, police operations targeted at the sources of narcotics and the LOC for narcotics movement.

e. Personnel Recovery. As with other military forces, certain SOF have the inherent capability to accomplish personnel recovery missions. However, SOF are not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct SAR or CSAR as continuing missions. The Services maintain forces dedicated to SAR or CSAR tasks, which possess operational alert procedures and dedicated C3 systems. There may be situations, however, when the specialized capabilities of SOF may be required to recover isolated personnel whose recovery is beyond the capabilities of component combat rescue forces. Such personnel recovery missions would resemble DA operations and would be characterized by detailed planning, preparation, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. SOF may provide greatest assistance to the theater CSAR effort through E&E and other UW operations, routinely coordinated with the JFC's JRCC.

f. Special Activities. Special activities are governed by Executive Order 12333 and require a Presidential finding and congressional oversight. These are activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives. They are conducted in such a manner that US Government participation is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, SOF may perform any of their primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed on special activities. Such activities are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled.

9. Coalition Warfare and SOF. SOF must be prepared to conduct SO under conditions of coalition warfare. SOF may be required to execute unilateral operations or apply their unique characteristics to provide liaison to coalition partners and, by so doing, facilitate interoperability between US and allied forces. As evidenced during operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the role that SOF played in support of the campaign objectives by training, working, and going into combat with the majority of the coalition nations was one of the keys to campaign success. SOF unique capabilities in language training, their regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support coalition warfare objectives.

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## CHAPTER III

### ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. General. SO require a responsive and unified C2 structure. Layering of headquarters within the SO chain of command decreases responsiveness, creates an opportunity for a security compromise, and is unnecessary. Normally, OPCON is exercised directly by a unified, subordinate unified, joint force, or Service or functional component commander without intervening levels of command. In rare instances, circumstances may require OPCON be exercised by a JSOTF commander reporting directly to the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Figure (III-1)). Regardless of the commander exercising OPCON control, the relationship should:

- a. Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
- b. Avoid frequent CHOP of SOF between commanders.
- c. Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.
- d. Ensure that SOF personnel to be employed are involved in the complete planning process: personnel conducting the mission must be thoroughly familiar with all operational and support requirements, and required mission capabilities must match those of the employment force.

#### 2. Assignment of SOF to USCINCSOC

a. By legislation (10 USC 167), all SOF based in CONUS including Army PSYOP and CA forces, are assigned to USCINCSOC who exercises COCOM over those forces. OPCON of those forces is exercised by USCINCSOC through subordinate JFCs, Service component commanders, or functional component commanders. Usually USCINCSOC, as a supporting commander, provides SOF to the commanders of other combatant commands who in turn exercise OPCON over those forces. However, in certain situations, the NCA may direct USCINCSOC to plan and conduct a special operation as the supported commander. In this situation, USCINCSOC would normally employ a task-organized JSOTF to plan,




Figure III-1.  
 Command Relationships for a JSOTF during Urgent or Politically Sensitive Situations

rehearse, and execute the operation, regardless of geographic location. When acting as a supporting commander, USCINCSOC may again establish a task-organized JSOTF and then CHOP the force to a theater CINC for execution based on command arrangements as established by the NCA. The NCA, however, could choose to exercise OPCON directly over a JSOTF without any intervening levels of command, depending upon urgency or political sensitivity (see Figure III-1).

b. When determining the relationship between USCINCSOC and theater CINCs, the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will consider national objectives, the degree and amount of conventional support required, the time-sensitivity of the operation, and the impact of the SO and its aftermath on the theater(s) concerned. To amplify, if the mission is of significant national political or strategic importance and requires a dedicated, perhaps low-visibility planning effort, the NCA may designate USCINCSOC the supported commander, regardless of the geographic location of the mission. For example, USCINCSOC might be directed to conduct a quick-reaction personnel recovery mission involving operations in or through more than one theater. On the other hand, a mission supporting ongoing theater operations or subject to unique theater military or political constraints may warrant designating that theater commander as the supported commander.

3. Assignment of SOF to Theater Combatant Commands. SOF based in theater are under COCOM of the theater combatant commander, and the provisions of Joint Pub 0-2 pertain. OPCON is exercised by the theater combatant commander and usually through the theater sub-unified SOC (see Figure III-2). The theater combatant commander may choose, however, to exercise OPCON through other subordinate unified commanders, JTF commanders, or Service or functional component commanders (see Figure III-3). For specific operations, a JSOTF may be established with OPCON of assigned SOF or SOF placed under OPCON or in support of conventional force commanders. To aid unity of effort, the gaining commander should assume joint operational reporting responsibilities for the gained SOF.

a. Theater SOC. When authorized by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater combatant commanders may establish a SOC as a




Figure III-2.  
 Command Relationships Between SOF and Service Commanders When OPCON is Exercised Through the Theater SOC




Figure III-3. Command Relationships Between SOF and JSOTF when OPCON is Exercised through Subordinate Unified or JTF Commander or Service or Functional Commander

subordinate unified or other functional command responsible for joint SO matters within its assigned area of operations. Joint Pub 3-0 makes provision for such functional alignments in its discussion of the JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC. The theater SOC is a specific example of the more generic JFSOCC concept. The SOC would normally be assigned broad continuing missions and areas uniquely suited to SOF capabilities that are of strategic and operational importance to the CINC. The theater combatant commander, then, may assign or attach to the SOC those conventional or special operational forces necessary for either a specific mission or for the conduct of sustained operations (see Figure III-2). Depending on mission, the JFC may delegate OPCON or TACON of conventional air assets to the SOC commander or provide them, less OPCON, in support of discrete SOC operations.

b. Other Component Commanders of a Joint Force. SOF may be placed under the OPCON, TACON, or in support of Service or joint force component conventional commanders. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. SO frequently requires joint SOF, and OPCON is often exercised through a JSOTF subordinate to the SOC. Depending upon the mission, however, the SOC commander may form a JSOTF around a SOC Service component by attaching appropriate SOF assets and then pass JSOTF OPCON to the theater Service component requiring SOF support (see Figure III-3). In this situation, a Service component commander might exercise OPCON over SOF that are predominately from another Service. Commanders all affected levels, therefore, should ensure that are employed within existing capabilities and that support arrangements allow for administrative and SOF-peculiar logistic requirements. Examples an arrangement include a Ranger battalion under the OPCON of an Army Corps to seize an airfield, a SOC-assigned NSWTU in support of fleet amphibious or strike operations, and an Air Force STT infiltrating sensitive area to emplace terminal guidance systems for conventional air operations.

c. Assignment to Combined Forces. When authorized the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater CINCs may place SOF units in support combined forces. In such instances, OPCON of

operational US SOF units would be normally exercised by an appropriate US commander within the combined command structure.

d. Joint Special Operations Task Force

(1) A JSOTF is organized in a manner similar to conventional JTF. A JSOTF normally is developed to meet a specific SO mission or a campaign of limited duration. It may be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater command guidance. For example, a theater combatant commander could elect to form a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific region of the theater and a JSOTF subordinate to that JTF to plan and execute SO required to support the overall conventional effort (see Figure III-3). Likewise, a theater SOC could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the area of responsibility assigned by the theater combatant commander.

(2) A JSOTF is an organization flexible in both size and composition. Its flexibility provides its primary utility. A JSOTF may be small and temporary or larger and more enduring, depending upon the national objective or theater task at hand. It may be specifically established as a joint organization to meet a specific mission or campaign or it may be formed around an existing Service force structure. In the latter case, an existing theater SOC component might be directed to form the core of a JSOTF when the preponderant force comes from that component. In such an instance, the existing headquarters would be augmented by appropriate forces from other Services and components (see Figure III-3). For example, a theater SOC commander may designate the Army SOF component as a JSOTF to pursue a FID operation in a given country. In this instance, the Army SOF is the preponderant force, but it may require augmentation in the form of air, maritime, or headquarters staff support to provide military assistance beyond its own capabilities. The FID and/or SA role presents some unique OPCON considerations. Routinely, military personnel conducting such a program are operationally responsible to a military assistance group that reports to the US Ambassador (See Figure III-4).




Figure III-4.  
 Command Relationships for SOF When TACON is Exercised Through a MAAG or MILGP



e. JFSOCC (SOC) Internal Organization. In accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, the JFC may choose to organize SOF for particular operations along JFSOCC (SOC) Service component or functional lines. In certain circumstances, a functional organization may better fit the demands of a specific SOF mission, especially given the limited number of SOF assets. Several different Service elements of the SOF possess similar capabilities. For example, Army SF, Air Force STT, and Navy SEALs can employ comparable amphibious tactics and airborne infiltration techniques, and the Army and Air Force both operate rotary SO aircraft with similar capabilities. Consideration should be given to aligning JFSOCC (SOC or JSOTF) forces executing similar missions under a single, functional (vice necessarily Service) component commander (See Figure III-5). Since the JFSOCC may need to conduct a range of discrete operations or support extended SO, he may choose to exercise either centralized or decentralized control of assets. This flexibility would allow the JFSOCC to establish, for example, various aviation task organizations ranging from a central pool of all air assets to small, tailored aircraft and support packages assigned to a JSOTF or other subordinate SO commands, as appropriate.

(1) A functional JSOACC provides organization and resource allocation for managing limited aircraft assets of different types and from different Services. JFSOCC requirements for air support flow through a single point of contact so that all requests may be satisfied by the best available air asset. Further, planning, coordination, and deconfliction are centralized. The liaison for this coordination and deconfliction is as important between the JFSOCC and the conventional theater component commands as it is between JFSOCC forces themselves.

(2) Recognizing that SO air support is often best provided in most instances when control is centralized and execution is decentralized, the JSOACC may best effect necessary assigned air asset allocation and provide liaison with




Figure III-5.  
Command Relationships for Alignment of JFSOCC Forces Under a Functional Commander.

conventional force commanders to provide additional support. The JFSOCC will normally designate as the JSOACC, either the SOC Service component commander providing the preponderance of aviation force or the SOC Service component commander most capable of conducting, commanding, and controlling operations within a given environment. The JSOACC is a subordinate commander within the SOC who is responsible not only for planning and executing joint SO, but for deconflicting SOA and conventional air operations. As such, the JFSOACC is not a competitor to the JFACC. JSOACC responsibilities parallel those of the JFACC only within the confines of SO missions. Proactive liaison with the JFACC is critical to ensure that all air assets are utilized properly and efficiently (See Joint Pub 3-05.3 for a detailed discussion of the role and functions of the JSOACC).

(3) Similarly, Army, Air Force, and Navy SOF employed in extended joint land or maritime operations may be placed under a single, functional SOF component commander.

#### f. Deconfliction and Coordination

(1) Deconfliction and coordination with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SO commanders. Areas of interest routinely include target deconfliction, C4, frequency allocation, intelligence collection efforts, surface or airspace deconfliction, fire support coordination, and coordination of logistic and other theater support. Historically, SOF have been employed in advance of conventional operations. This coordination is important in the transition from special to conventional follow-on operations and ensures that the timing and tempo of the overall unified campaign is maintained.

(2) SOF must be interoperable with conventional forces that either host or support their activities. This is especially true during time-critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forced entry operations, they must

be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of weapons, communications equipment, and shipboard logistics. Likewise, the host conventional force commander must tailor his own operations and command arrangements so as not to inhibit the operation of SOF, since that commander may not be in the SOF operational chain of command.

(3) During extended operations involving both SOF and conventional forces, joint control and deconfliction measures take on added significance. A tested method of achieving these measures is for the unified, subordinate unified, or JTF commander, as appropriate, to establish a JSOA.

(a) Coordinating and deconflicting SO with other joint operations will be critical. SO will often involve air operations that transit theater airspace control areas and the air defense area. SO ground forces often operate in areas affected by friendly conventional force surface and air attacks on enemy targets throughout the area of operations. Therefore, it is extremely important that SO be deconflicted with all other joint force operations. This requires close coordination between the JSOTF and JTF. (Additional guidance is provided in Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support" and Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Airspace Control in a Combat Zone.") SOF operations in enemy territory must be coordinated to prevent double targeting or fratricide.

(b) Joint deconfliction is further enhanced by the exchange of liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional and SO forces (see Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures" for details on liaison elements). The staffs may coordinate fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, PSYOP, CA, and other theater operational issues based on ongoing or projected SO missions. Their role at appropriate conventional force headquarters would be to

ensure crossflow of necessary operational and support information both to aid mission execution and to preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of on-going operations, or loss of intelligence sources. These efforts are crucial to maintaining the theater commander's overall unity of effort, coordination of limited resources and assets, and the campaign tempo.

4. Command Relationships. As already discussed, various organizational structures may be established for employment of SOF. Certain arrangements might be more commonly used during war or extended operations while others may be better suited for peacetime or contingencies of relatively short duration. However, the choice of organization for employment of SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment. Therein lies the flexibility of SOF. Figures III-1 through III-5 generically depict these arrangements.

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## CHAPTER IV

### PLANNING FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. General. Planning for SO can be either deliberate or time-sensitive, using crisis action procedures. (See Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Planning Policies and Procedures", and Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.") Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that SO planners must be brought into the planning process at the beginning, and that those who will execute the mission must be involved in that process. Likewise, political considerations usually figure prominently in the planning of SO. Changes in political objectives or constraints may cause operational characteristics to change rapidly and significantly. Considerations for planning SO are in Appendix D.

2. Strategic Planning and Force Allocation. The national security strategy of the United States seeks to assure and protect national interests that encompass much more than the pure military defense of the nation and its allies. In general, peacetime national policy is to prevent and deter aggression and acts of intimidation or terrorism that may hinder US political, economic, social, or military freedom of action or security. SOF play significant roles in this primarily political environment by offering uniquely trained and equipped units that can be tailored flexibly to execute a range of overt and low-visibility options designed to contain or resolve crises.

a. In military operations short of war, US national security policy is to protect US interests while containing and resolving the problem at the lowest possible level of violence or force allocation. In this environment, SO support other political, economic, and informational (psychological) elements of national power. However, limited tactical SO may be required.

b. Should these efforts fail, and conflict expand to war, US policy seeks to terminate the war (declared or undeclared) on favorable terms and at the lowest possible level of hostilities. SO may be conducted unilaterally or within the existing theater campaign in a direct manner against targets of significant value.

c. The military ways and means to achieve the national strategic objectives of deterring, and should deterrence fail, responding to armed conflict are identified by and allocated within the JSPS. This system is the formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff executes his responsibility to furnish short-term and long-range strategic plans and direction for the Armed Forces. Within the JSPS, the National Military Strategy Document provides the military strategy necessary to support national security policy and strategy. In the short-range (2 years), the JSCP provides military strategy guidance and assigns tasks to the theater commanders and chiefs of the Services. Importantly, the JSCP also apportions forces and strategic air and surface lift assets for theater planning. SO force availability and apportionment with respect to both global conflict and regional contingency planning are contained in Annex E to the JSCP.

3. Deployment Planning. JOPES is the process by which joint operational planning is conducted in both peacetime and during crises to meet the tasks identified in the JSCP. Principal goals of this process are to identify, resource, and phase those forces required to deploy in-theater. Additionally, plans must address transportation alternatives and ability to conduct in-theater reception of forces. Theater Service components must be informed of SOF deployments into their theaters, since service components are responsible for logistic support to their respective Service SOF.

a. Selection of those SOF to deploy and, later, operate in support of an OPLAN or CONPLAN must be based on a clear concept of what is to be accomplished on land, at sea, and in the air. This concept must be developed from an unambiguous understanding of the mission capabilities resident in SOF, a comparison of SOF capabilities with those of other assigned and/or supporting forces, and a knowledge of the targets and operating areas in the theater against which SOF could be employed to enhance the theater commander's campaign. Special and conventional operations must be linked coherently to ensure the success of the overall theater strategy and campaign plan.



b. General war plans routinely deal in vast numbers of personnel and support equipment, SOF included, designed to support large operations. However, certain crises could require rapid deployment of smaller forces, including SOF, either directly to the crisis location, or to an intermediate or remote staging base. In the first instance, the long-range insertion of SOF into an objective area requires that the deployment be planned as an integral part of the operation as opposed to mere transportation. In the second case, political and military considerations may warrant further specialized deployment planning. In either instance, the introduction of SOF into a theater must be planned commensurate with the specific strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and the attendant political environment.

#### 4. Theater Strategy, Campaign, and Employment Planning

a. The theater combatant commander refines broad national or alliance strategic guidance into a theater military strategy. That strategy identifies broad concepts and courses of action for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and apportioned US forces, including SOF, and the forces of allied nations, to achieve national and alliance strategic objectives.

b. The theater campaign plan is the operational extension of the theater strategy (See Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations", and Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations"). It establishes how the CINC intends to achieve his strategic objectives through a phased series of major operations, reflected in numerous theater OPLANs. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; sequence operations; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, and space operations. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders provide for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater of operations. Campaign plans communicate the combat commander's purpose, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to parent

Services so they may make necessary preparations. Additionally, they provide the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. The theater campaign plan will have an SO annex that:

(1) Provides the theater CINC's vision of how to employ assigned SOF either unilaterally or to support, complement, or extend conventional military operations in either national or coalition efforts.

(2) Transforms national, alliance, and theater strategic guidance into broad concepts of SO activities and sustainment that contribute to attaining strategic military objectives.

(3) Identifies requirements for USSOCOM and Service components to prepare, provide, and sustain theater-assigned and augmenting SOF.

(4) Identifies priority operational, weather, and intelligence requirements that theater SOF must address.

5. SOC Support to the Theater Campaign. The SOC commander participates in theater campaign planning by assisting in the preparation of the SO portion of theater campaign plans, OPLANS, and CONPLANS that are integrated into the theater joint operations planning process. These plans develop the theater CINC's concept of SOF employment into a sequence of integrated SO activities that support theater campaign and contingency plans. In so doing, the SOC commander maintains a theater-wide perspective on the CINC's campaign plan and how each conventional force commander intends to support that campaign. Based on guidance from the theater CINC, the SOC commander allocates forces to operational tasks, including support of component and subordinate JFCs. The SOC commander also identifies and anticipates theater operational, weather, and intelligence requirements that SOF could address and then develops and recommends to the theater CINC proactive SO that might satisfy those requirements. To assist in performing these functions during operational execution, the SOC commander should maintain liaison units at appropriate levels of each major theater subordinate command. This coordination facilitates deconfliction of SO with non-SO activities, helps guide target selection

and apportionment for both conventional and SOF requirements, and aids the integration of SO into overall campaign plans.

#### 6. Deliberate Mission Planning and Targeting

a. Detailed mission planning, based on specific detailed, comprehensive, and accurate tactical intelligence is vital to successful mission execution and also to the very survival of the operational element. Based on the SOC commander's mission guidance, subordinate SOF commanders conduct their own deliberate mission planning. The objective of this process is to develop a comprehensive plan that provides for flexible execution. SO force commanders cannot tie themselves to a rigid plan. They must anticipate the unexpected and remain flexible enough to modify their plans, as required, to achieve their higher commander's intent.

b. Deliberate SOF targeting and mission planning may require days or weeks to prepare for commitment into remote or denied territory. The operational and selected support elements must gain a thorough knowledge of the operational area. Personnel must understand the geographic, political, social, psychological, economic, climatic, and military situation in the target area. For some missions, they must also know the culture, language, customs, and ethnic and religious affiliations and antagonisms of the target audience that could affect mission execution. This level of area orientation is achieved either through intensive study before employment, or, better yet, by having previously lived in the intended area of operations.

c. SO in permissive environments (for example, a security assistance mission performed at the request of the host nation) may be less complex and, therefore, require considerably less planning and preparation time. The same is true for certain short-duration SO activities directed against less sophisticated threats in a semipermissive environment (for example, a personnel recovery mission in a nonaligned nation). Under these conditions, there is less requirement for elaborate infiltration, re or exfiltration planning. However, while the complexity of the mission may be reduced, SOF are not

excused from thoroughly planning the operation, gaining knowledge of the cultural aspects of the target area, and developing a range of appropriate alternative means to accomplish the mission should the operational environment change during employment.

d. Regardless of the mission or operational environment, three principles of SO planning remain important:

(1) Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed. Limited resources and the extensive planning required dictate that a commander selectively employ SOF for high priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may force the NCA to place specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force size constraints upon the employing and supporting force.

(2) SOF missions are complete packages--insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction--to be thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key planning factors. They will dictate the size and capabilities of the assigned force, the nature of tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support structure. Although operational planning must focus on the objective, limiting intelligence and environmental information to the target area will not meet SOF requirements.

(3) SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fail, since SO targets normally are perishable either from a military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, detailed, and, whenever possible, repeated rehearsal is critical. These rehearsals should be conducted with the exact force to be committed and under the same time and distance constraints in an environment whose terrain and weather conditions closely approximate the operational area. A by-product of such rehearsal is that the operational element absorbs

alternative courses of action and is better able to adapt to changed circumstances during the mission. Commanders should recognize and plan for such preparation time.

#### 7. Time-Sensitive Mission Planning and Targeting

a. Clearly, there will be those crises, especially in peacetime, that do not lend themselves to deliberate planning. Targets and objectives may be clear, but time may become a critical factor and impose constraints on planning and other mission preparation not experienced during deliberate planning. This is significant because the success of any SO is largely depends on the quality of mission preparation.

b. If time is insufficient for normal planning, the SOF commander must determine minimum essential preparation tasks and modify normal procedures to accomplish those tasks in the time available. The commander must inform the SOC or JSOTF commander when these minimum-essential preparation tasks cannot be accomplished without an unacceptable degree of risk of mission failure. However, at a minimum, efforts must be taken to adequately address at least those principles addressed in subparagraph 6d above.

8. Criteria for Evaluating SO Options. To avoid misapplication of SOF, commanders should evaluate SOF employment potential for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability at the commencement of planning.

a. Appropriateness. Missions must be especially suitable for SOF capabilities and compatible with national policies.

(1) Suitability for SOF Capabilities. The target or the mission environment must have a unique aspect that requires the use of SOF and renders the mission unsuitable or less suitable for action by conventional forces or other national assets. The mere existence of a target is not justification for assignment of SOF. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. Political constraints, the need for precise and flexible application of force, or the avoidance of collateral damage, among others, may be suitable justification for the use of SOF; lack of conventional force is not.

(2) Compatibility with National Policy. Planning for SO must be in total conformance with national goals and policies. Assumptions regarding relaxation of certain national policies or rules of engagement to enhance the feasibility or desirability of SO are not valid unless endorsed by the NCA. Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission. Measurement of risk should take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units, but the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

b. Feasibility. Successful execution of SO missions requires complete planning of all phases of the operation: infiltration, movement to the objective, actions at the objective, withdrawal, and extraction. (Planning for extraction is critical, especially during DA or CT missions, since by then the element of surprise is often lost.) SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. Planning cannot ignore the vulnerability of SOF units operating in hostile territory. Feasibility assessments should also compare the skill levels required for successful execution, current training levels of SOF units to be tasked, and the time required for planning and attainment of necessary levels of individual and unit proficiency to meet the specific mission at hand.

c. Supportability. Resources and capability should be adequate to support the individual SO being considered and, when applicable, the entire SOF operation plan. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. Not only should there be infiltration and exfiltration platforms of sufficient number and capability to support the envisioned SO, but there should be adequate and timely support airlift, logistic, intelligence, weather, and C4 system support. Even though the target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in supportability may affect the scale of the contemplated SO or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.

9. Operational Security. OPSEC is used by SOF to deny information of intelligence value to hostile, or even friendly, agencies that could cause direct or indirect mission compromise. OPSEC is critical during SOF employments throughout the operational continuum.

a. The initial planning step for SO must determine the level of OPSEC protection required. (CJCS MOP 29, "Joint Operations Security", and Joint Pub 3-54 provide guidance.) Requisite security measures, including deception and C4 protection, must be implemented immediately. During initial OPSEC planning phase, SO tactics, capabilities, personnel movements, and logistics should be protected in all phases of the operation including the post-execution phase.

b. The need for OPSEC must be properly balanced against the need for coordinated planning, execution, and deconfliction of these activities with conventional operations. Compartmentation of and special access to certain information may be necessary, however, commanders must balance the need for secrecy against the need for coordination. Key planners from all disciplines (i.e., intelligence, deception, PSYOP, medical, fire support, C4 systems, logistics, and conventional liaison) should be involved with the SO planners in all phases of planning. The keystone of SO is whomever will EXECUTE the mission must PLAN the mission.

#### 10. Military Deception Initiatives

a. SOF should be capable of planning and conducting military deception operations. Similarly, military deception or perception management efforts may use actual SO and the threats SOF present to support the theater campaign. Theater deception or military deception initiatives that use or support SOF should not inadvertently heighten enemy awareness of SOF operations.

b. Most SO rely on secrecy and an unalerted enemy for mission success. However, the execution of some SO missions may reveal the presence of SOF to the enemy owing to distinct operating signatures.

c. Military deception initiatives should be manifested in concert with a cohesive OPSEC and PSYOP plan focusing on the culture, social organizations, intelligence collection and communications infrastructure of the targeted force (see paragraph 6 of Chapter V of Joint Pub 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine", and, Joint Pub 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operational Security.").

(1) If the objective is to preserve secrecy of SOF activities, deception may be used to support OPSEC. Such deception initiatives may be diversionary operations to focus enemy attention away from actual objectives, or more likely, deception efforts may be informational programs designed to mislead target audiences and cover activities to deny recognition of SOF.

(2) If the objective is to influence the adversary, OPSEC would be part of the deception effort. Actions may include deceptive feints, displays, and ruses; intrusive or deceptive communications; or exploitation of terrain and weather to mislead the opposition.



## CHAPTER V

### PREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1. General. SOF require training, equipment, and support that are tailored to specific mission requirements yet are flexible enough to respond to changing employment parameters. The joint character of SO also requires support arrangements across Service lines and emphasis on the frequently extraordinary support required to sustain often remote and independent joint SO. Further, SOF must exploit the full range of available national support systems such as those offered by emerging technologies and space-based assets.

#### 2. Training Responsibilities

a. USCINCSOC. USCINCSOC is charged by legislation with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings as described herein and ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. This responsibility is shared with the theater commanders and the Services. The Services are primarily responsible for all basic individual military skill training and common professional military education. SO-peculiar individual, continuation, and professional training and education are the direct responsibility of USCINCSOC. Component commanders of USCINCSOC design and monitor upgraded and continuation training programs to meet the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. Joint SO training is the shared responsibility of USCINCSOC and the theater CINCs. Training CONUS-based SOF to meet theater CINC requirements is a USCINCSOC responsibility. Theater CINCs also conduct their own joint exercises, which are supported and monitored by USCINCSOC. Such exercises stress SOF under conditions resembling the operational environments in which they will be tasked. Further, those exercises build and reinforce the regional area orientation required to support theater campaign plans. This orientation, including language and cultural familiarity, is labor-intensive and may take years of preparation for units to reach full capability.

b. Theater Combatant Commanders. Theater combatant commanders, through the theater SOC and in

coordination with USCINCSOC, should articulate SO joint mission-essential tasks required to support theater campaign plans, OPLANS, and CONPLANS. USCINCSOC should develop and resource the SO-specific training architecture. SO Service components should develop supporting mission-essential tasks for USCINCSOC validation and implement training programs to meet validated requirements.

### 3. Logistic Support of SOF

a. General. Support of joint SO places unique and additional demands on Service and theater logistic systems. Although the majority of SOF sustainment requirements are satisfied by standard Service support systems, the operational circumstances inherent in SO require logistic support that is tailored and structured for joint and combined SO. SOF logistic support includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities, and services.

b. Support Responsibilities. The Services are responsible for providing logistic support to their own SOF. When deployed, SOF are normally supported by the theater Service component commander unless otherwise provided for by agreements, servicing assignments, or other directives. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF sustainment requirements, the theater commander may direct another Service to provide this support. SOF will normally use standard Service logistic systems, supplies, and services. When the JFSOCC (the SOC, JSOTF, or other joint SOF commander) determines that standard Service and theater Service component logistic systems are unresponsive or inadequate, the Services, in coordination with the combatant commands and theater Service component commands, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided.

c. SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SO mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and services belongs to USCINCSOC. This support will be

provided to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components.

d. SO Logistic Support

(1) SOF will normally deploy with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain operations for 30 days, unless otherwise directed by the theater commander. This 30-day requirement may be supplemented by PWRS, operational projects, preplanned host nation support, and/or other preplanned support until a demand-supported supply system has been established. This is a baseline planning figure for extended operations. Contingency responses may require tailoring smaller support packages. Further, certain SOF deploy with less sustainment (e.g., Rangers, with three days).

(2) SO may be conducted with little prior notice and are usually in advance of general mobilization. Therefore, logistic units tasked to support SOF should be designated for all CJCS-approved OPLANS and CONPLANS. Designation of logistic support units by the theater Service component commanders ensures that recurring support relationships are established and exercised.

(3) Equipment with a high degree of reliability and redundancy is required in the preparation and conduct of SO. For certain rapid response, short-duration operations, SOF may require single-use, disposable items applicable only to that mission. In all cases, equipment should be simple, interoperable, and easily repaired. Maintenance should be modular, rapid, and occur as far forward as operationally feasible and practical. Since SOF may operate in austere locations, equipment should incorporate built-in test and diagnostic capabilities. The operational reliability requirement for equipment used by SOF may require higher than normal spare parts stockage and equipment floats.

(4) SO bases will normally be established at US or allied military bases to exploit existing facilities and logistic infrastructure. However,

operational requirements may dictate a wide variety of potential basing options. Staging and operational bases may be located aboard US or allied naval ships, at CONUS installations, in allied countries, and, possibly, within secured areas of operations in hostile or denied territories. Regardless of the location of these bases, they must be logistically supportable and provide the requisite security for mission planning and execution. When SO bases are established, the theater JFSOCC commander should ensure that common logistic support and services are consolidated between and among Service SOF components. Support operations in and around SO bases present highly visible OPSEC signatures. Consequently, the SOF commander should advise and assist base commanders to develop base support routines and procedures that can mask accelerated, unusual, or increased activity when necessary.

(5) Certain SOF units maintain dedicated medical support packages that are organic to and employable with the operational unit. However, the organic medical capability of SOF units is normally limited, and SOF medical elements usually rely on significant augmentation from theater medical force structures. When host nation medical support agreements are negotiated to support US SOF, the medical treatment and services must be consistent with US military health care standards. US military medical support may be provided to non-US forces (allied, indigenous, or Third country nationals) when approved by the theater commander. Medical support to non-US personnel may include treatment at US military medical facilities, evacuation or transport, medical supplies, and consulting assistance. (See Joint Pub 4-02, "Health Service Support in Joint Operations," for detailed procedures.)

(6) When planning SO logistic resupply operations, commanders should note an important distinction concerning SOF resupply and medical evacuation operations. The resupply and medical (often air) evacuation of SOF, when operating from forward bases or in remote or denied areas, are usually planned and executed as operational missions, as opposed to being treated as logistic

responsibilities. Consequently, detailed logistic and operational planning is required to ensure that sufficient supplies and adequate delivery platforms are available for on-call, automatic, and emergency resupply and evacuation operations for employed SOF. Resupply planning is the responsibility of the deployed force commander, who must assess existing supply levels and SOF delivery platforms. Should deficiencies exist, the JFSOCC (SOC or JSOTF commander) should elevate logistic needs to the JFC or theater logistics staff, as appropriate, for coordination with theater Service component or USSOCOM logistic structures.

e. Combined or Indigenous SO Logistic Support

(1) US SOF conducting combined SO with allied SOF or conventional forces will normally be supported by US logistic systems unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANS or CONPLANS.

(2) Indigenous forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported SO may provide the major portion of their logistic support requirements. However, when approved by the theater CINC, US SOF may furnish military supplies, services, SO-peculiar equipment, supplies and services, and US medical support in accordance with directives and approved OPLANS or CONPLANS.

f. Resourcing. Fiscal support of SOF and SO will be accounted for and expended IAW DOD directives, instructions, and Service regulations.

4. C4 Systems Support of SOF

a. General. C4 support to SO must be jointly interoperable, reliable, secure, redundant, lightweight, flexible (capable of being mission tailored), and highly mobile and must provide LPI/D. Further, SOF C4 capabilities must furnish weather and intelligence information (data, imagery, or narrative) to all operational and planning levels. These characteristics are equally applicable to C3 systems installed in a base station as they are to systems employed in the field or aboard air, naval, or

space-based platforms. C4 requirements are critical initial planning considerations for any SO. While emerging technologies in communications, as well as all other areas, offer great promise to improve existing capabilities, SOF must not rely only on state-of-the-art systems but must be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in lesser developed nations. Quite frequently, the nature of the target and its demographic and climatic environment will dictate the type of communications employed.

b. SO Communications System Guidance. C4 doctrine normally favors centralized planning with decentralized execution. Control is exercised from the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination. (In some cases, political considerations may require control at high national levels.) This flexibility necessitates that SOF possess long and short-haul secure communications and that the theater commanders, through Service components and the theater SOC, develop and maintain a communications architecture capable of supporting all SO missions. C4 support must meet time-sensitive DA or CT missions where operational teams maintain direct contact with the highest tasking authority and meet fully integrated communications nets among numerous operational and support elements during long-term FID activities or UW. Use of space-based systems often provides both the tactical and long-haul communications required by SOF.

c. Interoperability. All SOF elements participating in a common mission must have the capability to communicate with each other, even if it is not initially intended to employ some of the communications links. Additionally, SO elements must interoperate with US national C4 resources, as well as with allied and host nation C4 systems. SO elements also must have the capability to communicate with US conventional forces involved in the mission or that would be involved during emergency situations, including medical, rescue, and evacuation units. Therefore, interoperable equipment and procedures must be available for any operation. Transmission means, modes of operation, and communications security equipment and procedures that inherently restrict communications interoperability must be minimized.

Secure, reliable, LPI/D inter- and intra-Service communications connectivity capabilities are required at team level. SOF elements must have the capability to communicate with the next higher command echelon within its Service or functional SO component, nearby SOF units from other Services, and those adjacent Service element's higher headquarters, as well as the SOC, JSOTF, or JTF headquarters, as appropriate. An example of this requirement would be a Special Forces team that is able to communicate not only with its forward operational base but with NSWTUs and Air Force SO Detachments in its operating area. (For a detailed discussion of communications and other SO C2 interoperability issues, see Joint Pub 3-05.3).

d. SOF C3 Systems. SOF C4 systems support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. C4 systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. Throughout SO networks, C4 must be a synchronized and unified entity if it is to be effective. The C4 planner must be brought in early into the SO mission planning. Timely and detailed preparation can identify and solve most system installation, operation, maintenance, compatibility and interoperability issues in support of C2 requirements. Joint Pub 6-0 and Joint Pub 6-05, Volume 1, are applicable.

5. Intelligence Support of SOF. Intelligence must assist commanders in identifying special operations objectives that will further overall objectives. All other aspects of military operations depend on the determination of relevant, clear, and attainable objectives. In the process of identifying and nominating military objectives, the J-2 should understand the command's responsibilities, commander's mission and intent, the means available, and the characteristics of the theater or joint operations area. Intelligence should provide the commander with an understanding of the enemy in terms of enemy goals, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, and critical vulnerabilities. The J-2 then nominates as objectives those commander's ends and intent. Once objectives are determined, intelligence must continuously review them to see if they remain relevant to the commander's intent.

a. General. Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in determining SO

objectives, identifying relevant targets, and mission planning and execution. The US intelligence community includes numerous agencies that support various echelons of the command structure. Those agencies differ in purpose and the degree to which they support tactical mission requirements of individual operational elements. Just as intelligence requirements for different conventional forces vary, so do some of the intelligence requirements for SOF. In fact, SOF intelligence requirements are similar to those of conventional forces, although the degree of detail is frequently greater. However, the nature of many SOF objectives and methodologies require intelligence support different from that needed in conventional operations. SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to directly engage the enemy. A large percentage of such intelligence data is available within the US intelligence community and/or open source material. However, many "target-specific" items require more research, analysis, graphics, photos, and textual elaboration than normally needed for conventional mission planning. If target-specific intelligence is not available, analogies or estimates drawn from similar targets in the same region must be provided.

(1) The mechanics (procedural and technological) of providing suitable SO intelligence support must be flexible enough to satisfy both the time-sensitive (combat or crisis) and deliberate (peacetime or routine) mission planning processes. Intelligence requirements and OPSEC should be considered carefully to ensure that adequate intelligence can be acquired without compromising the mission. Adaptive or emergent targeting offers the most rigorous and critical conditions for conducting effective SO intelligence support. The system's ability to meet urgent, short-notice requirements is critical. Adaptive or time-sensitive requirements should also be used by the SO peacetime or routine intelligence support organization in order to facilitate periodic readiness exercises and effective transition to actual combat or crisis support. By continuous tasking during peace to support the SO mission planning process, the system's capability to effectively support SOF in



wartime will be refined. An efficient, deliberate intelligence planning structure can meet accelerated requirements during crisis.

(2) The primary nonorganic sources for SO intelligence are the Service combat intelligence and production organizations, the theater CINC J-2s, NSA, and DIA. SOF requirements must be identified and prioritized within overall national and theater intelligence requirements and capabilities. In conjunction with DIA, the theater CINC J-2s ensure that SO intelligence requirements are identified, understood, validated, and satisfied. For this arrangement to work, SOF commanders must develop and communicate these requirements to the intelligence community at the inception of a mission to ensure determination of relevant objectives and operations, and effective planning can begin. This will allow the intelligence community maximum time to respond, especially during time-sensitive operations. Optimum support is achieved through constant interaction and feedback between commanders and intelligence and operations personnel.

(3) Interface through the theater SOC to theater and national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SOF success. SOF mission accomplishment may hinge on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF, when formed, must have these same interfaces.

(4) Intelligence organizations routinely provide maps, charts, and photographic and imagery support to all SO forces. Additionally, Naval Mobile Environmental Teams often provide similar support to NAVSOF. Maps and charts are intelligence products. Geographic intelligence on terrain, cultural, and demographic factors affect mission determination; ingress, egress or cross-country movement analysis; and options for terminal area and evacuation operations.

(5) Intelligence support to SOF in LIC requires an expanded focus of the standard scope of intelligence functions. This is particularly true

in FID operations. Intelligence must contain aspects related to political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships as well as enemy and friendly forces and target specific data.

b. Targeting. Targeting is the intelligence function of evaluating the enemy's intent and capabilities with respect to the commander's mission and objectives and identifying and nominating critical enemy activities, situations, capabilities or resources that are vulnerable to military operations (Joint Pub 2-0). SO targeting, like conventional targeting, combines intelligence and operations. It represents the integration of intelligence threat information, the target system, and target characteristics with operations data on friendly force posture, capabilities, weapons effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine. Targeting matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations to identify the forces necessary to achieve the objectives. SOF are limited in size and, therefore, must be judiciously applied against high-value, high-risk, or intelligence-critical targets whose destruction, elimination, degradation, or surveillance would have significant positive and lasting effects on achieving US national objectives or on a theater campaign plan. A coherent SOF targeting doctrine must encompass the full range of SOF mission characteristics. (See paragraph 6 of Chap IV above, and Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.")

c. Counterintelligence. CI is a critical force protection asset that offers the commander varied support including operations, investigations, collection, and threat analysis. The commander should be well informed on the capability and effectiveness of host nation intelligence and security services.

(1) Early Deployment. Commanders and their planning staffs should consider the advance deployment of CI teams to establish liaison with host nation security forces and the US Country Team when possible. CI teams should be identified in deployment lists and operational orders.

(2) Command and Control. Upon execution of the operational plan, command and control of the

supporting service CI elements will be assigned to the theater component commander. A CISO should serve as the theater CI Coordinating Authority. Coordination of CI support will be effected between the CISO and the supporting SOF headquarters intelligence element and the supporting service CI element.

(3) Threat Analysis. CI analysis may be conducted at the theater (Joint Intelligence Centers) or national (DIA, CIA, or Services) level. Threat information available to the commander includes the intelligence threat, by either human or technical collection means, posed by foreign intelligence services and other adversarial organizations.

6. PSYOP and CA Support of SOF. The JFSOCC integrates PSYOP and CA support of joint SO activities. Task-organized PSYOP and CA detachments, from theater PSYOP and CA forces, may be assigned or attached to the JFSOCC (normally the SOC) for a specific period to provide dedicated support. The impact of CA and PSYOP specialists working in support of SF is often measured in conflicts prevented and lives saved rather than through the application of lethal force. CA and PSYOP support provide the SOF commanders and their indigenous counterparts the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments of the population to enhance the probability of mission success. (For a doctrinal examination of missions, capabilities, and functions of PSYOP and CA forces, see Joint Pubs 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine" and 3-57, "Joint Civil Affairs Doctrine.") Likewise, SOF must be prepared to conduct limited PSYOP and CA in support of UW and FID operations. This is inherent in the area-orientation and indigenous force training and assistance skills required by these missions. Further, SOF may be required to conduct direct PSYOP by placing documents, transmitters, or other similar PSYOP tools in target areas.

7. Manpower or Personnel Support of SOF. SO units receive their manpower or personnel support through normal Service channels. The theater JFSOCC (SOC or JSOTF) monitors issues regarding the forces assigned to the JFSOCC and coordinates with the respective Service components and the theater commander for qualified replacements. The JFSOCC may expedite SOF personnel actions that have become operationally significant (for

example, an inadequate replacement flow that will render a SOF unit not fully mission-capable). This may include involuntary extension or curtailment of duty tours, if required, to provide an effective rotation schedule. The commander of the theater JFSOCC routinely must coordinate personnel issues and policies with the respective Service components and the theater commander.

8. Public Affairs Support of SOF. The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that thorough and accurate PA guidance be developed during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most operations. PA planning must integrate accurate representation of the mission to domestic audiences with the overall PSYOP operations effort and strategic and tactical OPSEC programs. The commander having operational authority should develop proposed PA guidance, coordinating with supporting commands and government agencies, as appropriate, and forward that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.

9. Legal Support of SOF. SO frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are Federal laws and Executive Orders, Federal agency publications and directives, and theater ROE that may affect SO. These guidelines become especially critical during sensitive peacetime operations when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements may affect mission planning and execution. Commanders should seek legal review during planning and execution of SO.

10. Environmental Support of SOF. Environmental support services (weather and oceanography) are critical to the success of SO missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental intelligence should be included in the decision making process. Unique local conditions may expedite a particular course of action or make it impossible. Oceanographic surveys provide data on currents, surfs, tides, reefs, and dangerous marine animals. An examination of general climatology and specific weather forecasts for the operations area will provide the commander with the data necessary to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific missions. Potentially, the execution decision may turn on exploiting certain adverse weather conditions to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper

operations. Such decisions often require finesse and judgment. For example, many SOF aircraft are designed to operate at low level, at night, and in adverse weather (fog or moderate rain). However, heavier rain or sandstorms, for example, may exceed avionics operating limits. Since SO may be conducted over very great distances or extended periods of time, environmental planning and projection become critical components in the operational decision; a focus on just the target or terminal areas is too narrow. Support to the JFSOCC (SOC or JSOTF) may be provided on a continuing basis by specially trained and organized USAF or USN elements. The USAF Special Operations Weather Teams provide environmental support predominantly to AFSOF and ARSOF. NMET provide environmental services principally to NAVSOF. Support from the NMET includes weather and oceanography as well as maps and charts. Provision of selected maps and charts to AFSOF and ARSOF is routinely provided via intelligence channels (see paragraph 5 above).

11. Space Support of SOF. Space-based support to military operations is continuing to improve. SO commanders and planners should be aware of potential space support for their operations and how best to obtain it. A sampling of space-based capabilities includes:

- a. Guidance, navigation, and air and maritime traffic control.
- b. Global communications.
- c. Global intelligence collection.
- d. Surveillance and warning.
- e. Meteorological support.
- f. Imagery for mapping and targeting.
- g. EW.

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## APPENDIX A

### US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix provides information on major aspects of US Army SO. Although all Army forces have an inherent capability to support SO, Army units specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared, trained, and task organized especially for SO. (Generic theater organizational arrangements are in Figure A-1.) Core SOF designated by the Secretary of Defense include active and reserve component SF, Ranger, and SOA. In addition, the Secretary of the Army has designated CA and PSYOP forces as ARSOF. Service doctrine for structure, employment, support, and sustainment of ARSOF is detailed in FM 100-25, "Doctrine for Army Special Forces."

2. Special Forces Group. The SF group is a multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments throughout the operational continuum. Although principally structured for UW, SF units are capable of task-organizing their composition to meet more specific requirements.



a. Organization. SF are organized into groups of three battalions, each with one support and three operational companies. Each company is composed of a headquarters element and six ODs of 12 personnel. SF units are regionally oriented to specific areas of the world and possess language training and cultural familiarity.

b. Missions. The primary missions generally assigned to SF are UW, FID, SR, DA, and CT. Also, certain SF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CT as a principal mission.

c. Capabilities

(1) The command, control, and support elements of an SF group can:

(a) Function as the Army component of a JSOTF or as a JSOTF when augmented by resources from other Services.



**Figure A-1. ARSOF Command Relationships**

Figure A-1. ARSOF Command Relationships



(b) Command, control, and support organic and attached elements.

(c) Establish and operate with the group HQ an SFOB and up to three FOB by employing its organic battalion HQ (C detachments).

(d) Provide up to three C2 elements (B detachments) to corps or higher conventional headquarters or to specified operational areas. B detachments can also operate as tactical C2 elements.

(2) The ODA of an SF group can:

(a) Infiltrate or exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.

(b) Conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with appropriate support or resupply.

(c) Plan and conduct SO unilaterally or as part of a larger force.

(d) Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to a battalion in size.

(e) Organize, train, advise, and assist US, allied, and other friendly military and paramilitary forces or agencies in the conduct of SO, especially in environments requiring language proficiency and area and/or cultural orientation.

d. Limitations. SF units:

(1) Generally require specialized support from other military Services and nonmilitary agencies for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply.

(2) Are restricted in their ability to conduct sustained combat operations by limited firepower, mobility, organic combat support, and combat service support assets.

(3) Dependent upon the resources of the theater Army component to support and sustain operations.

(4) Endurance and fatigue as influenced by terrain, mode of transport, environment, enemy situation, and weather.

e. Employment. SF may be employed as individuals, teams, or larger units up to group in size. The principal operating element is the ODA. SF elements are frequently task organized for specific missions, but are rarely, if ever, employed outside their specific area of orientation.

3. Rangers. Rangers are rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint DA operations in coordination with or in support of other SO units of all Services. Also, they can execute DA operations in support of conventional missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms.

a. Organization. Rangers are organized into a regiment of three battalions. Battalions are organized into a headquarters company and three rifle companies, each composed of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.

b. Mission. When employed in SO, Rangers are primarily tasked to conduct DA and other special light infantry missions. They may conduct these operations independently, in support of conventional forces or other SOF.

c. Capabilities. The Ranger regiment can:

(1) Deploy quickly to conduct operations on all types of terrain and in all weather conditions.

(2) Establish a credible US military presence in any part of the world to demonstrate US interest or resolve.

(3) Infiltrate and exfiltrate an area of operations and assault an objective by land, sea, and air.

(4) Conduct DA missions consisting of raids, ambushes, and recovery operations.

(5) Conduct special light infantry operations, including seizing and securing airfields, port facilities, communications centers, C2 facilities, and critical chokepoints on LOC.

(6) Perform short-duration reconnaissance at the tactical level in support of assigned Ranger missions.

(7) Provide personnel and equipment to support the headquarters and C3 functions of a JSOTF.

(8) Exercise C2 of other Army SO (SF, SOA, etc.) or conventional forces for the conduct of limited combined arms operations.

d. Limitations. Ranger regiments have:

(1) Limited antiarmor firepower and protection.

(2) Limited air defense capability.

(3) Limited indirect fire support.

(4) No transportation or casualty evacuation capability and limited combat service support resources.

(5) Endurance and fatigue as influenced by terrain, mode of transport, environment, enemy situation, and weather.

e. Employment. Ranger units normally are employed in battalion or in multibattalion formations, but may be employed on company missions if provided adequate support. Missions are normally of short duration and include a planned withdrawal or relief by other forces. Normally mounting operations from a secure base, Ranger units require augmented combat service and other support before, during, and when refitting from operations.

4. Special Operations Aviation. SOA units are specialized Army aviation assets dedicated to the conduct of SO activities.

a. Organization. SOA units are organized into both single aircraft type and composite battalions that provide a mix of light and medium lift and limited light attack capabilities.

b. Missions. SOA supports SOF in all principal and collateral mission areas and can conduct autonomous SR and DA missions.

c. Capabilities. SOA elements can:

(1) Infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF by clandestine penetration of hostile or denied airspace with great precision for extended ranges and, on properly equipped aircraft, during adverse flying conditions (limited visibility and adverse weather).

(2) Conduct light attack, light lift, reconnaissance and surveillance, EW, personnel recovery and medical evacuation.

(3) Support airborne C3 for SOF elements.

(4) Provide control of close-in and indirect fire support to SOF.

(5) Limited capability to self-deploy certain rotary wing aircraft without logistical support or personnel.

(6) Conduct operations from maritime platforms.

(7) Perform AVUM and limited AVIM on all assigned aircraft, armament, and avionics.

(8) Provide the C2 element for establishing a JSOACC, if directed. (See expanded JSOACC discussion in Chapter III.)

d. Limitations. SOA units:

(1) Expend large quantities of Class III-A and V-A supplies during sustained operations.

(2) Have limited EW capabilities and require ESM/ECM support from other Services during clandestine penetration missions.

(3) Are designed to operate from a secure base and requires logistic support from the supported command, particularly POL, ammunition,

transportation, food service, aviation repair parts, and operating facilities. SOA units also require CLS at FOB for maintenance of specialized systems and overflow AVIM support.

e. Employment. SOA may be employed in detachments, platoons, companies, or battalions. They are frequently task-organized internally or with AFSOF assets to provide the most capable mix of resources for a specific mission. They may operate from fixed bases, remote field locations, or from surface shipping. Their range is longer than conventional Army aviation units because SOA are capable of carrying larger internal and external fuel loads. Some SOA assets are equipped with inflight refueling.

5. Civil Affairs Forces. CA forces plan and conduct civil-military operations in support of SOF and conventional forces. Army CA units are regionally oriented, language qualified, and have the capability to train, advise, and assist US and indigenous forces in the conduct of FID, UW, and HA or CA missions. (See Joint Pub 3-53 for CA command relationship with the theater SOC).

6. PSYOP Forces. Task-organized elements from either strategic or theater PSYOP forces may be provided to support joint or Service SOF and conventional forces. Frequently, this support is imperative during FID, UW, and HA or CA but may be equally applicable during DA, CD, or CT activities, either as direct support or to provide operational cover (See Joint Pub 3-57 for PSYOP command relationship with the theater SOC).

7. Special Mission Units. The NCA has directed establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions across the operational continuum. They are under direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units are prepared and trained to execute a variety of covert and/or clandestine SO missions while maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.

8. Special Operations Coordination Elements. SOCCORDs serve as a permanent staff functional cell within corps G-3. This cell reinforces integration of ARSOF into corps plans and operations. The SOCCORD does not exercise C2 of ARSOF, but compliments existing ARSOF mechanisms.

9. SOF Support Units. The US Army maintains combat support and combat service support elements and units capable of supporting and sustaining SOF. Principal among these are TASOSCs, 528th SOSB, and the SO signal battalions.

a. Theater Army Service components routinely field a TASOSC, which plans and coordinates support and sustainment of theater-assigned ARSOF. The TASOSC provides administrative and logistical support to in-theater Army SOF as well as other designated forces. The TASOSC is not an operational element but routinely works in close coordination with the theater SOC.

b. The 528th SOSB, unique to the Army structure, provides a limited direct support unit capability for ARSOF in contingency of logistically austere situations. The SOSB meets early surge demands until the theater CSS structure matures to the point where they can meet SOF requirements.

c. The SO signal battalion is a specialized signal unit that can provide dedicated support to the theater SOC, its subordinate component headquarters, or a JSOTF.

## APPENDIX B

### US NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix provides information on major aspects of NSW operations. Although all Navy forces have the potential for supporting SO, specific units designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared and task-organized to conduct SO: active and reserve component SEAL teams, SDV teams, SBU and selected special mission units (see Figure B-1). In addition, other surface, subsurface, and aviation units receive enhanced training and equipment to support NSW operations.

2. SEAL Teams. SEAL teams are a maritime multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments and levels of conflict.

a. Organization. The SEAL teams are organized into a headquarters element and operational platoons. Each team is composed of 10 operational platoons, each of which can be broken down into either 2 squads or 4 elements. All personnel are dive, parachute, and demolitions qualified.

b. Mission. SEAL teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct DA, UW, FID, SR, and CT operations primarily in maritime and riverine environments. These operations include sabotage, demolition, intelligence collection, hydrographic reconnaissance, and training and advising friendly military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of naval and joint SO. Further, SEAL teams may be employed in direct support of conventional naval and maritime operations.

c. Capabilities. SEAL teams can:

(1) Destroy or sabotage enemy shipping, port and harbor facilities, bridges, railway lines, communications centers, and other LOC in and around maritime areas and riverine environments to undermine the morale or degrade the military, political, or economic strength of the enemy.

(2) Infiltrate or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas, evaders, and escapees. Infiltration and




Figure B-1. NAVSOF Command Relationships



exfiltration of SEALs may be by submarine, surface vessel, aircraft, or land vehicle.

(3) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence-gathering tasks, including capture of key personnel.

(4) Accomplish limited civic action tasks that are normally incidental to FID and HA operations, such as medical aid, elementary civil engineering activities, and boat operations and maintenance for the indigenous population.

(5) Organize, train, assist, and advise US, allied, and other friendly military or paramilitary forces in the conduct of any of the above tasks.

(6) Integrate NSW task organizations into fleet task forces or groups to plan, coordinate, and conduct maritime SO to meet fleet-specific requirements.

(7) Can operate in desert, arctic, jungle, urban, riverine, or maritime environments.

d. Limitations. SEAL elements:

(1) Require specialized support for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply.

(2) Are restricted in their ability to conduct sustained firepower, mobility, organic combat support, and combat service support assets.

(3) Are dependent on the theater Navy component commander for logistic support.

(4) SEAL units are not equipped for sustained, direct engagements against enemy forces.

(5) Carry minimum amounts of equipment, munitions, and light armament consisting primarily of individual weapons.

3. SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams. SDV teams are a maritime combat force organized, trained, and equipped to operate and maintain combat submersible systems in maritime or riverine environments.

a. Organization. Each SDV team is organized into a logistic support element, four SDV platoons, and two DDS platoons.

b. Missions. The mission of an SDV Team is to employ, operate, and maintain combat submersible systems in the conduct of naval and joint SO. SDV teams may be employed to conduct SO in a maritime or riverine environment. Typical mission profiles will vary because of differences in delivery of the SDV from forward basing to the objective area. Options available to a commander to meet different tactical situations include launch and recovery via submarine, surface combatant, or noncombatant craft. The most clandestine option is submarine launch and recovery.

c. Capabilities. SDV teams:

(1) Conduct limited DA missions such as port and harbor antishipping attacks and raids.

(2) Conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and other intelligence-gathering missions.

(3) Infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF.

(4) SDV personnel maintain limited capabilities to operate in riverine and maritime environments, in either desert, arctic, or jungle climates.

d. Limitations. SDV teams:

(1) Are limited in speed and distance by propulsion system, sea state, and weather.

(2) Can carry a limited amount of equipment.

(3) Require transportation to the operating area. Mobility is best achieved by submarines equipped with DDS. Other means of transportation are air and surface sea lift.

(4) Require a support base for extended employment. (Sustainment in operating area is limited.)

4. Special Boat Units. SBUs consist of active NSW, fleet, and Reserve component personnel organized, trained,

and equipped to operate a variety of surface combatant craft in both maritime and riverine environments. (See Joint Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations.")

a. Organization. SBUs are organized into a headquarters element and several combatant craft detachments, depending on number and type of vessels assigned.

b. Mission. The mission of the SBU is to employ, operate, and maintain a variety of surface combatant craft to conduct and support naval and joint SO, riverine warfare, and coastal patrol and interdiction. The craft most frequently employed are offshore, open-water fast patrol boats and shallow-draft riverine patrol craft.

c. Capabilities. SBU elements:

(1) Infiltrate and exfiltrate SOF.

(2) Provide small-caliber gunfire support and limited shore bombardment.

(3) Conduct coastal patrol, surveillance, harassment, and interdiction of maritime LOC.

(4) Conduct operations to assist in the training of fleet units in countering fast patrol boat tactics.

(5) Advise, train, and assist allied and friendly forces in the operation, maintenance, and employment of various patrol and penetration craft.

(6) Participate in other FID activities, in addition to those in subparagraph (5) above.

d. Limitations. SBU elements:

(1) Are limited in range based on fuel, sea state, and current.

(2) Are limited in size and amount of equipment and weapons that can be carried.

(3) Require a support base or platform for extended employment.

(4) Require extensive transportation assets and dedicated air or sea lift from theater apportioned resources.

5. NSWTG or NSWTU. These are task organizations tailored from resources of a NSWG and its subordinate commands that will be composed of various NSW and supporting elements. They may operate unilaterally, jointly, or in combined operations. Their mission is to provide C2, administration, and logistic support for assigned units. OPCON of designated NSW forces may be assigned to a JFC or remain with the fleet commander to support fleet amphibious and strike operations. The NSWTG and NSWTU are flexible in size and composition. Several NSWTUs could be operationally subordinate to a NSWTG, or an NSWTU could report directly to a JSOTF, for example, if the scope of operations and size of the deployed force were limited.

6. Special Mission Units. The NCA have directed the establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions throughout the operation continuum and are routinely under the direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units are prepared and trained to execute a variety of SO missions under covert or clandestine circumstances while maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.

## APPENDIX C

### US AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix provides information on major aspects of USAF SO. Although all aerospace forces have the potential for employment in SO depending on the operational environment and the capabilities required to accomplish the mission, specific units are structured principally to conduct or support SO as their primary mission. AFSOF is an umbrella term for those active and reserve component Air Force forces that are assigned by the Secretary of Defense primary responsibility to conduct and support SO. They include (a) specially equipped fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft, (b) specially trained aircrews for infiltration or exfiltration, resupply, aerial fire support and aerial refueling, and (c) special tactics, weather, communications, and other combat support units.

2. Organization. AFSOF may be organized into an AFSOC for joint operations.

a. The commander of an AFSOC assigned to a unified or subordinate unified command normally directs, coordinates, and integrates the USAF SOF air effort through control of assigned and attached Air Force forces. The AFSOC may be further structured into wings, groups, and squadrons, or be tailored into detachments (AFSODs) or elements (AFSOEs) (see Figure C-1). The size and composition of the organization will depend on the nature and length of the mission, the type of aircraft and personnel involved, the type of sustainment required, and the characteristics of the facilities from which operations will be conducted. Regardless of size, an AFSOF organization will typically contain operational and C2 elements, as well as maintenance, logistics, security, C4, intelligence, and selected facilities support.

b. The JFSOCC routinely has assigned to his command core AFSOF aircraft and supporting organizations to satisfy unique and continuing requirements. Further, for specific missions, the JFC may provide the JFSOCC certain other Navy, Marine, Army or Air Force sorties. The JFACC or, if a JFACC is not designated,




Figure C-1. AFSOF Command Relationships

appropriate theater conventional component commander will task sorties to support the JFSOCC. Those forces would be provided on a mission-by-mission and priority availability basis or for a specified and usually short period of time. Additionally, the forces (e.g., fighter escort, close air support, bomber, electronic warfare, aerial tanker, airlift) may be provided in support of the JFSOCC rather than assigned to it.

3. AFSOF Mission Capabilities. Aircraft must be capable of operating in hostile airspace, at low altitudes, under conditions of minimum visibility (darkness or adverse weather) while navigating precisely within narrow time parameters, to arrive at specifically defined drop or landing zones, infiltration or exfiltration points, or targets. Deceptive ECM, including LPI/D radios, and passive warning systems are used to avoid engagement by enemy defenses. Additionally, some AFSOF aircraft are capable of performing autonomous DA and SR missions. The AFSOF are organized and trained to permit tailoring the size and composition of the force to meet the particular SO requirement. The AFSOF may include fixed- and rotary-wing transport, aerial tanker, fixed-wing gunship, PSYOP support aircraft, and specially trained ground personnel as either JFSOCC-assigned or JFSOCC-attached resources. Further, other joint force assets may be provided in support, on a mission-by-mission basis.

a. SO airlift aircraft, composed of transport or cargo and vertical-lift resources, provide low-visibility, clandestine, or covert penetration of hostile, sensitive, or denied airspace to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate ground and maritime forces in support of UW, DA, SR, and CT operations. Fixed-wing aircraft require the capability of using minimum-length, unimproved landing strips. Vertical-lift aircraft can land in confined areas or hover over selected targets and use rope ladders, hoist, or repelling or fast-rope procedures to infiltrate or exfiltrate personnel.

(1) Vertical-lift aircraft can be equipped for adverse-weather, all-terrain, long-range infiltration and exfiltration, suppressive fire support, personnel recovery, medical evacuation, and PSYOP.

(2) Highly specialized fixed-wing aircraft are equipped for deep penetration of hostile areas through use of electronic defense systems, terrain following or terrain avoidance tactics, and are capable of airlanding or airdropping personnel, equipment, and psychological warfare materials, or extracting personnel by airborne pickup devices or airlanding.

b. Certain AFSOF units may train, assist, and advise the Air Forces of other nations in support of FID. These activities may require selective AFSOF language skills and detailed area orientation. Unlike support to UW, DA, SR, and CT missions, AFSOF participation in FID often does not focus on high technology equipment. Rather, AFSOF must be prepared to lend expertise on a level of technology compatible with host-nation resources and capabilities. Involvement in such FID activities may include operations, maintenance, and logistic support to host-nation counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and other related security assistance operations.

c. Certain fixed-wing, long-range AFSOF assets are equipped to refuel rotary-wing aircraft in flight, thereby significantly extending the range of the rotary-wing aircraft. Certain SOF aerial tankers, when equipped, may also be refueled from strategic fixed-wing tankers.

d. Fixed-wing gunships are equipped with a variety of sensors and weapons to acquire and engage static and moving surface targets in both an interdiction and CAS role or to provide armed escort. Aircrew training and avionics capabilities allow these aircraft to function at night and in adverse weather.

e. Certain Reserve component AFSOF aircraft are designed to provide employment platforms for PSYOP personnel to conduct operations in support of theater operational objectives or specific contingencies. Other SOF aircraft may be employed in PSYOP or PSYWAR roles supporting special or conventional missions.

f. STTs consist primarily of SO Combat Control and Pararescue personnel. The STTs are organized,



trained, and equipped to establish and operate air assault zones and Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP) in austere and nonpermissive environments. STTs direct and position aircraft by verbal control, beacon operations, or other visual or electronic acquisition aids. They designate targets; assist in offensive attack, demolition operations and extraction of forces; provide HUMINT, airfield reconnaissance, and limited weather observations. STTs conduct personnel recovery and advanced trauma care, coordinate evacuation operations, and are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct selected aircrew duties.

g. The SOWT/TE of the Air Force Air Weather Service is capable of operating in remote and austere locations under most climatic conditions. It can operate independently in permissive and semipermissive environments or as augmentation to other SOF in nonpermissive environments. These elements obtain forward weather observations from either friendly, hostile, or denied areas and maintain a limited air and surface forecast capability in the absence of normal weather data sources.

h. AFSOF base station and deployed C4 requirements are met by the tactical SOCCE. The SOCCE is a deployable tactical communications unit capable of providing secure and clear voice and data communications among AFSOF units and between them and JFSOCC (SOC and JSOTF) headquarters and other Service SOF elements.

4. AFSOF Limitations. AFSOF assets are designed to operate most effectively in particular environments and under specific methods of employment. As a general rule, AFSOF assets become less effective when employed outside their intended operational environments. For instance, infiltration or exfiltration platforms and gunships may be less effective in conditions other than darkness and adverse weather. Planners must be familiar with the specific capabilities and limitations of each AFSOF platform as spelled out in appropriate technical manuals and orders. Broad-based limitations that apply generically to all AFSOF, because of their nature, include:

- a. Limited self-deployment or sustainment capability and dependence on established support or logistic packages that must accompany employment aircraft. Operations may be sustained from a bare base. However, the technological sophistication of most AFSOF resources limits their beddown flexibility.
- b. Degraded mission effectiveness resulting from increased sophistication of enemy defenses.
- c. Extensive maintenance support required by high-technology avionics equipment.
- d. Possible restrictions on the duration or frequency of employment because of aircrew endurance, aircraft systems limitations, and maintenance and flying regulations.
- e. Aerial tanker support required by long-range deployment and employment.
- f. Extremely limited defensive air-to-air capabilities.
- g. Dependence on conventional air support for defensive counter air, air defense suppression, and other capabilities, as dictated by the threat.

5. Special Mission Units. In addition to the SOF discussed above, the NCA have directed the establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions. They may be conducted in peacetime competition, conflict, or war and are routinely under the direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units, generically referred to as special mission units, are prepared and trained to execute a variety of SO missions under covert or clandestine circumstances while maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.

6. Augmenting USAF Forces. Although not designated by the Secretary of Defense as core AFSOF, certain conventional forces may receive enhanced training and may be equipped and organized to conduct missions in support of SO. These improvements are principally designed to

enhance the primary combat capabilities of the conventional force or to support SO on a nondedicated, mission-specific basis. But, they do not provide these forces with the capability to conduct unrestricted unilateral activities across the full range of SO missions. These forces include:

- a. SO Low-Level. These are basic fixed-wing strategic and theater (tactical) airlift forces which, by virtue of special aircrew training or aircraft modification, could augment AFSOF for the conduct and support of selected SO.
- b. Strategic Tankers. Air Mobility Command maintains a limited number of strategic tanker crews trained to support the often unique refueling requirements of AFSOF fixed-wing aircraft.
- c. Other. Depending on the mission, any DOD aerospace assets may be allocated by appropriate authority to support SO, depending on the capabilities required. This support is usually mission-specific and of short duration. Such capabilities may include strategic or tactical bombing or airlift, airborne warning or control, EW, reconnaissance, deception, or space-based support.

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## APPENDIX D

### JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING GUIDANCE

Commanders and planners employing joint and single-Service SOF should adhere to the following guidance. (Specific employment guidelines and coordination or deconfliction procedures will be included in supporting JTTP.)

- a. SOF offer combinations of unique military capabilities routinely not resident in conventional forces. SOF may be applicable WHEN nonmilitary options are insufficient, conventional options are inappropriate or infeasible, and WHERE results are required beyond the influence of conventional forces. Further, HOW the NCA or a combatant commander requires the operation to be conducted (e.g., minimal collateral damage, covert, clandestine) may dictate SOF employment.
- b. SOF capabilities may be applicable to missions throughout the operational continuum. The threat environment, itself, does not characterize SO. For example, LIC defines a broad environment for politico-military confrontation, while SOF offer unique capabilities within that environment. LIC does not equate to SO, even though SOF may be applicable to a given LIC environment. In this regard, SO could best be considered a form of warfare, regardless of where they are executed along the operational continuum.
- c. Frequently, political ramifications of SO may be viewed as more critical than strict military considerations. The role of SOF is frequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive nonmilitary activities to occur. Commanders should view each SO in broad and long-term political, military, and psychological dimensions, which may impose legal and political constraints on operations.
- d. The decision to employ SOF may turn on the need for a rapid, low-visibility response of limited size. Therefore, OPSEC, COMSEC, cover stories, deception, and compartmentation must be integrated at the first stage of operational planning.

e. SOF are not structured in size, depth, or equipage to meet every contingency. Therefore, commanders should clearly assess the risk by comparing the value of the target to the possible loss of the force and the attendant embarrassment to the nation or negative impact on the theater campaign.

f. SO are inclusive. Before any employment decision, the mission must be comprehensively planned beginning with "action at the objective" and must concurrently include development of the profiles for infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of the forces. Emphasis on preplanning for extraction is critical since, by the time extraction is required, the element of surprise is often lost, particularly in short-duration operations.

g. Under most circumstances, SOF cannot sustain themselves for extended periods.

h. SOF are not designed to engage opposing forces directly with standard tactics. If forced into such action, SOF must rapidly disengage and reevaluate their effectiveness for continued operations. Reinforcement is not a routine option for SOF.

i. SOF are frequently joint. Likewise, many operations require close interdepartmental or interagency coordination. These circumstances mandate care in maintaining unity of effort.

j. SOF depend on interoperable, secure, lightweight, redundant, and short- and long-haul C4 systems.

k. Missions may require the employment of special weapons and equipment, often of a nonstandard configuration. Frequently, unique development and acquisition actions may need to be pursued urgently.

l. Logistic support still remains a basic Service responsibility. However, commanders should take great care to avoid either overlaps or deficiencies in the Service support to a force that is frequently joint. Routine supporting procedures must be established and maintained to avoid highlighting SOF operational activity by unusual or nonroutine methods of support; and logistic planners must be incorporated at the beginning of the SO planning effort.

m. Often, missions require SOF to employ state-of-the art technology. However, certain operations, particularly in FID or UW, may require use of equipment of lower (or even obsolete) technology that is compatible with the people and environment of the operational area.

n. SOF are most effective when used in proactive vice reactive operations. Initiative, speed, surprise, audacity, intuition, and mobility are critical SOF planning elements. When employing SOF in FID or UW operations, commanders should consider the indirect role of advising, training, and assisting foreign indigenous military and paramilitary forces. This indirect approach may best further US interests while minimizing US visibility and risk. Such operations exemplify the often protracted politico-military nature of SO and require patience and policy consistency.

o. SOF are most effectively employed when centralized decisionmaking gives way to decentralized planning and execution. Joint operational planning should be accomplished on a face-to-face basis. The SOF hallmark: those who will execute the mission must plan it.

p. Commanders must maintain maximum flexibility by developing a broad range of options. But, although SO often require extensive, complex planning and rehearsal, the goal always must be to develop the simplest execution options possible.

q. Real-time, real-distance rehearsals, conducted under terrain and climatic conditions similar to the operational environment, which include all players and in which nothing is simulated, greatly enhance the probability of mission accomplishment.

r. Layered levels of either command or support have historically proven detrimental to the conduct of effective SO. Rather, a principal benefit of SOF is their capability to be organized flexibly and provided directly to the appropriate employing commander in a properly-sized task organization.

s. Senior commanders should provide for rapid and smooth conventional force support planning and coordination for SO.

t. Planning may necessarily be compartmented, but care must be taken to involve all required personnel from the outset. Commanders should ensure that misperceptions or misunderstandings within and outside the SOF community are avoided.

u. Detailed and current target-specific intelligence, often of more detail than that required by conventional forces, is necessary in SO mission planning. Further, data must be available to the lowest execution levels.

v. Although forces have the capability to conduct quick reaction missions under certain circumstances, normal mission planning and preparation may require 72 hours or longer from mission tasking, with an additional 24 to 48 hours needed to conduct insertion and movement to the target. Political sensitivities may preclude putting force into a country or into a position from which to conduct their mission effectively. If so, additional time may be required to conduct that operation.

w. SO may require conventional support for suppression of enemy defenses, escort, reconnaissance, deception, close air support, naval surface fire support, and other similar capabilities. To exploit these capabilities fully, planners should coordinate such support as early as possible in the planning process.



## APPENDIX E

### APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

General. The operations of the Armed Forces are guided by a common set of principles of war. They are established in joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations." The principles apply to SO as follows:

- a. Objective. Objectives assigned SOF may often be as political, economic, or psychological as they are military. In war, SO objectives predominantly focus on enemy military vulnerabilities without direct force-on-force confrontation. In situations short of war, SOF may be assigned objectives that lead directly to the accomplishment of national or theater level objectives.
- b. Offensive. SO are inherently offensive. Although SO may be employed in the context of a strategically defensive effort, at the operational and tactical level they are employed offensively.
- c. Mass. SOF are not employed to mass in the conventional sense. Acceptance of attrition or force-on-force battle is not applicable to SO. SOF must concentrate their combat power, albeit subtly and indirectly, at decisive times and places. Care must be taken not to fragment the efforts of SOF against attractive but perhaps operationally or strategically irrelevant targets. Extensive SO planning and rehearsal are required to achieve temporary superiority of force or, better yet, to avoid engagements altogether. In SO, concentration of force relies as much on the quality and focus of tactics, timing, and weaponry as it does on numerical quantity.
- d. Economy of Force. SOF may be employed strategically as an economy of force measure to allow the concentration of other forces elsewhere. This may be particularly effective when SOF are employed in conjunction with indigenous forces to create a "force multiplier" effect, or when so are conducted for the purpose of deception.
- e. Maneuver. SOF do not maneuver against an enemy in the classical sense. With respect to SO, maneuver implies

the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. When employed, maneuver implies the ability to adjust the plan in order to concentrate and strike the enemy where and when it is most vulnerable and to disperse to avoid its strengths. Such flexibility in planning and execution is especially germane to SO.

f. Unity of Command. To achieve unity of effort, SOF organize with clean, uncluttered chains of command. Layering between the headquarters assigning the mission and the operational unit that conducts it is strictly avoided.

g. Security. Security is paramount to SO. Planning is often compartmented and planning staffs are kept small. However, within a compartmented activity, information must be shared by all. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, cover and deception, and EW are all integrated throughout the planning and execution of SO to enhance security and achieve surprise.

h. Surprise. The achievement of surprise must be a principal talent of SOF. SO require bold, imaginative, and audacious actions but must be tempered with patience and forethought. SOF achieve surprise by exploiting indirect approaches and doing the unexpected.

i. Simplicity. Although SOF may often use sophisticated and unorthodox methods and equipment, the plans and procedures that drive their employment must be simple and direct in order to facilitate understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and be adaptable to changing situations.

## APPENDIX F

### USERS EVALUATION REPORT ON JOINT PUB 3-05

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to directly submit comments on this pub. Please fill out and send in the following: Users' POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

#### 2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic?

b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated?

c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved?

d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs?

e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How?

#### 3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use?

b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them?

#### 4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any).

#### 5. Other

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

( FOLD )

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FROM:

THE JOINT STAFF, J-7  
ATTN: JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER  
NORFOLK NAVAL AIR STATION,  
NORFOLK, VA 23511-5380

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( FOLD )

## GLOSSARY

### PART I-ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADCON	administrative control
AFFOR	Air Force forces
AFSOB	Air Force Special Operations Base
AFSOC	Air Force special operations component
AFSOD	Air Force Special Operations Detachment
AFSOE	Air Force Special Operations Element
AFSOF	Air Force special operations force
ARFOR	Army forces
ARSOC	Army special operations component
ARSOE	Army special operations forces
AVIM	aviation intermediate maintenance
AVUM	aviation unit maintenance
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C4	command, control, communications and computers
CA	civil affairs
CAS	close air support
CCT	combat control team
CD	counter drug
CHOP	change of operational control
CINC	commander of a unified or specified command
CD	counterdrug
CISO	counter intelligence support officer
CLS	contractor logistic support
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONPL	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CT	counterterrorism
DA	direct action
DDS	dry deck shelter
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOS	Department of State
E&E	evasion and escape
ECM	electronic countermeasures
ESM	electronic warfare support measures
EW	electronic warfare
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FID	foreign internal defense
FOB	forward operations base
GW	guerrilla warfare

HA	humanitarian assistance
HALO	high-altitude low-opening parachute technique
HQ	headquarters
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JOPEX	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOACC	Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LIC	low intensity conflict
LOC	lines of communications
LPI/D	low probability of intercept/detection
MAAG	military assistance advisory group (assigned to American Embassy in host nation)
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MEU(SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MILGP	military group (assigned to American Embassy in host nation)
MSPF	Maritime Special Purpose Force
MTT	mobile training team
NAVFOR	Navy forces
NAVSOC	naval special operations component
NAVSOX	USN Special Operations Forces
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NCA	National Command Authorities
NMET	Naval Mobile Environmental Teams
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSW	Naval Special Warfare
NSWG	Naval Special Warfare Group
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NSWTU	Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
NSWU	Naval Special Warfare Unit

OD	operational detachment
ODA	operational detachment-Alpha
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PA	public affairs
POLAD	political advisor
PSYOP	psychological operations
PYWAR	psychological warfare
PWRS	pre-positioned war reserve stocks
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	Security Assistance
SAR	search and rescue
SBU	special boat unit
SDV	SEAL Delivery Vehicle
SEAL	sea-air-land (Team)
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces Group
SFOB	Special Forces Operations Base
SMU	special mission unit
SO	special operations
SOA	special operations aviation
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	special operations forces
SOSB	Special Operations Support Battalion
SOWT/TE	Special Operations Weather Team/Tactical Element
SR	special reconnaissance
STT	special tactics team
TACON	tactical control
TASOSC	Theater Army Special Operations Support Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USAFSOF	USAF Special Operations Forces
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USC	United States Code
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, USSOCOM
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

## PART II-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force Special Operations Base. That base, airstrip, or other appropriate facility that provides physical support to USAF Special Operations Forces. The facility may be used solely to support Air Force Special Operations Forces or may be a portion of a larger base supporting other operations. As a supporting facility, it is distinct from the forces operating from or being supported by it. Also called AFSOB. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force special operations component. The Air Force SO component of a unified or subordinate unified command or JSOTF. Also called AFSOC. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force Special Operations Detachment. A squadron-size headquarters, which could be a composite organization composed of different Air Force SO. The detachment is normally subordinate to an Air Force SOC, JSOTF, or Joint Task Force, depending upon size and duration of the operation. Also called AFSOD. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force Special Operations Element. An element-size Air Force SO headquarters. It is normally subordinate to an Air Force SO command or detachment, depending upon size and duration of the operation. Also called AFSOE. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Air Force Special Operations Forces. Those active and reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support SO. Also called AFSOF. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. See also counterterrorism and terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

architecture. A framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)



area assessment. The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Army special operations component. The Army SO component of a unified or subordinate unified command or JSOTF. Also called ARSOC. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

Army Special Operations Forces. Active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support SO. Army SOF active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of the Army that are capable of supporting and sustaining SOF. Also called ARSOF. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

automatic resupply. Resupply mission fully planned before insertion of Special Operations Forces into the operating area that occurs at prearranged time, unless changed by the operating team after insertion. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

beach landing site. A geographic location selected for across-the-beach infiltration, exfiltration, resupply operations. Also called BLS. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

blind transmission. Any transmission of information that is made without expectation of acknowledgement. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02).

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (Joint Pub 1-02).

cell. Small group of individuals who work together for clandestine or subversive purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

clandestine operation. Activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor.) In Special Operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat control team. A team of Air Force personnel organized, trained, and equipped to establish and operate navigational or terminal guidance aids, communications, and aircraft control facilities within the objective area of an airborne operation. Also called CCT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified; e.g., Combined Navies.). (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined warfare. Warfare conducted by forces of two or more allied nations in coordinated action toward common objectives. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

compartmentation. 1. Establishment and management of an intelligence organization so that information about the personnel, organization, or activities of one component is made available to any other component only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties. 2. Effects of relief and drainage upon avenues of approach so as to produce areas bounded on at least two sides by terrain features such as woods, ridges, or ravines that limit observation or observed fire into the area from points outside the area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

compromise. The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional forces. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterguerrilla warfare. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

cover (military). Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible, yet erroneous, explanation of the observable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

covert operations. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

denial measure. An action to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of obstructions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

denied area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

emergency resupply. Resupply mission based on a predetermined set of circumstances and time interval should radio contact not be established, or once established, is lost between the main base and the operating team. (See Automatic Resupply). Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape. The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape net. The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force multiplier. An element that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhancing the probability of successful mission accomplishment. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point. A temporary facility, organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area of operation than the aviation unit's combat service area, to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward operations base. In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is controlled and/or supported by a main operational base. Also called FOB. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (Joint Pub 1-02).

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

infiltration. 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal). (Joint Pub 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives his authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be

limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force land component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFLCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within the joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations aviation missions and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special operations air component commander normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint force commander as directed. Also called JSOACC. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a unified or subordinate unified commander or the commander of a joint task force to the commander of joint special operations forces to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)



low intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

low visibility operations. Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). A forward-deployed, embarked US Marine Corps unit with enhanced capability to conduct special operations. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is oriented toward amphibious raids, at night, under limited visibility, while employing emissions control procedures. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is not a Secretary of Defense designated special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities and/or the theater commander, may conduct hostage recovery or other special operations under in extremis circumstances when designated special operations forces are not available. Also called MEU(SOC). Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

maritime special purpose force. A task-organized force formed from elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) and naval special warfare forces that can be quickly tailored to a specific mission. The maritime special purpose force can execute on short notice a wide variety of missions in a supporting, supported, or unilateral role. It focuses on operations in a maritime environment and is capable of operations in conjunction with or in support of special operations forces. The maritime special purpose force is integral to and relies directly upon the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) for all combat and combat service support. Also called MSPF. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

mobile training team. A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national objectives. Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation--as opposed to the means for seeking these ends--toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, b. favorable foreign relations position, or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval mobile environmental team. A team of naval personnel organized, trained, and equipped to support maritime special operations by providing weather, oceanography, mapping, charting, and geodesy support. Also called NMET. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare. A specific term describing a designated naval warfare specialty and covering operations generally accepted as being unconventional in nature and, in many cases, covert or clandestine in character. These operations include using specially trained forces assigned to conduct unconventional warfare, psychological operations, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operational deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal and river interdiction, and certain special tactical intelligence collection operations that are in addition to those intelligence functions normally required for planning and conducting special operations in a hostile environment. Also called NSW. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare forces. Those active and reserve component naval forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NAVSOF. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare group. The Navy organizations to which most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. It consists of a group headquarters with command and control, communications, and support staff, sea-air-land teams, special boat squadrons and subordinate special boat units, and sea-air-land team delivery vehicle teams. The group is the source of all deployed naval special warfare forces and administratively supports the naval special warfare units assigned to the theater CINCs. The group staff provides general operational direction and coordinates the activities of its subordinate units. A naval special warfare group is capable of task-organizing to meet a wide variety of requirements. Also called NSWG. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare special operations component. The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called NAVSOC. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare task group/unit. Task organized elements that provide command, control and communications for naval special warfare forces deployed in support of fleet commanders, special operations commands of unified and subordinate unified commands, and joint special operations task forces. Also called NSWTG/TU. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

naval special warfare unit. Permanently theater-deployed command element to control and support attached naval special warfare forces. Also called NSWU. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

nonpermissive environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

on-call resupply. Resupply mission considered in planning prior to insertion of special operations forces into the operating area. It is executed on request from the operating team. See also emergency resupply. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are: a. permissive environment--Operational environment in which host-country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. semipermissive environment--Operational environment in which host-government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. c. nonpermissive environment--Operational environment that is under control of hostile forces that have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These

activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security. A process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

overt operation. Operations conducted openly without concealment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

pararescue team. Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

permissive environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

political warfare. Aggressive use of political means to achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological warfare. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. Also called PSYWAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers can also execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sea-air-land team. A group of officers and individuals specially trained and equipped for conducting unconventional and paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in such operations including surveillance and reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and coastal areas. Commonly referred to as SEAL team. (Joint Pub 1-02)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. Also called SAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

semipermissive environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special activities. Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives which are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special boat unit. Those US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support naval special warfare, riverine warfare, coastal patrol and interdiction, and joint special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft designed primarily for special operations support. Also called SBU. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special forces group. A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, special forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. Also called SFG. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special forces operations base. A command, control, and support base established and operated by a special forces group or battalion from organic and attached resources. The base commander and his staff coordinate and synchronize the activities of subordinate and forward-deployed forces. A special forces operations base is normally established for an extended period of time to support a series of operations. Also called SFOB. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special mission unit. A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform a specific mission. Often used to describe highly classified activities. Also called SMU. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial-operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command composed of designated special operations forces that is established by a unified or other joint force commander to prepare for, plan, and execute, as directed, joint or single-Service special operations within the joint force commander's assigned area of operations, or as directed by the National Command Authorities. Also called SOC. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations forces. Military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which are designated for special operations, as that term is defined, and are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Also called SOF. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations peculiar. Equipment, materials, supplies, and services required for special operations mission support for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. It often includes nondevelopmental or special category items incorporating evolving technology but may include stocks of obsolete weapons and equipment designed to support indigenous personnel who do not possess sophisticated operational capabilities. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)



special operations weather team/tactical element. A task organized team Air Force personnel organized, trained, and equipped to collect critical weather observations from data-sparse areas. These teams are trained to operate independently in permissive or semipermissive environments, or as augmentation to other special operations elements in nonpermissive environments, in direct support of special operations. Also called SOWT/TE. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

special tactics team. An Air Force team composed primarily of special operations combat control and pararescue personnel. The task of the team is to support joint special operation air, ground/maritime missions by selecting, surveying, and establishing assault zones; providing assault zone terminal guidance and air traffic control; conducting direct action and personnel recovery missions; providing medical care and evacuation; and coordinating, planning and conducting air, ground, and naval fire support operations. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength, or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

task organizing. The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistics package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also antiterrorism, combatting terrorism, and counterterrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. Also called UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

